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I. Introduction
Just cause is the single most important factor governing the decision
to make war under customary international law. Interestingly enough,
customary international law reached its pinnacle by the late 18th century,
when the United States adopted its Constitution.' Consequently, the
basic criteria and distinctions of customary law, particularly those
pertaining to just cause, were influential in the Constitution's allocation
of war powers. Just cause is also the central element in the centuries-old
just war doctrine of Christian thought.2 Indeed, customary international
law adopted the concept of just cause nearly whole cloth from just war
doctrine. Accordingly, just cause is the unifying thread that runs through
customary international law, the U.S. Constitution, and the just war
doctrine.
For centuries, customary law recognized a state's right to use force
defensively against attack and offensively to punish and exact
compensation for legal wrongs. However, since at least 1945, with the
creation of the United Nations, there has been a radical departure from
customary international law. The provisions of the U.N. Charter
governing the use of force differ from customary law in two ways.
First, the U.N. Charter attempts to monopolize the offensive use of
force, thereby denying states that right. 4 Second, the Charter permits
U.N.-sanctioned force on grounds far more expansive than states are
permitted under customary law.5 The Charter does not limit the United
Nations to defending states and enforcing judgments for legal Wrongs.
Rather, it allows the United Nations to secure peace by imposing a
particular vision of social, political, economic, and ideological order that
it perceives is in the global interest. These two facts place the U.N.
1. Arguably, the influence of customary international law upon American legal tradition is
evident from the following: Emmerich de Vattel's THE LAW OF NATIONS is the culminating treatise
of classic international law. EMMERICH DE VATIEL, LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty trans.,
1863). Part I of volume I of James Kent's COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, the preeminent
American legal treatise of the 19th century, is devoted to international law. JAMES KENT, 1
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (12th ed. 1873) (1758). Kent cites Vattel more than any other
authority. He also notes that Vattel had been cited more freely for 50 years than any other writer
despite what Kent believed were deficiencies of philosophical precision and insufficient citation of
authority for precedent. I Id. at 18.
2. Just cause is one of several elements that comprise classic just war doctrine as it emerged
after centuries of development in Western Christianity. For an analysis of all the elements of the
just war doctrine, see infra part V.
3. See infra part III.A.
4. See infra part II.B.
5. Id.
JUST CAUSE
Charter outside the pale of both customary law and the just war
doctrine. *
Through both its membership in the United Nations and a
transformation of its national mission, the United States has significantly
altered its application of domestic law'.6 The U.S. participation in the
United Nations could be secured only through novel interpretations of the
U.S. Constitution, resulting in a shift of the war powers from Congress
to the President and U.N. Security Council.7 Moreover, as the national
mission has changed, the touchstone for the use of force has shifted from
the legal standard of just cause to the political test of national interest.'
To further complicate matters, since -the Security Council has not
functioned militarily as originally conceived, the United States has
attempted to justify its own unilateral use of offensive force through
implausible interpretations of the U.N. Charter.9 All of this breeds
public cynicism toward law which comes to be viewed as little more than
a political tool of indeterminate content used to justify policy choices.
Operation Just Cause, the 1989 U.S. military invasion of Panama,
illustrates these contentions.' ° As a case study, it offers a fairly discrete
and manageable set of facts. The Panama invasion, and the U.S.
justification for this action, raise each of the fundamental issues and
highlight critical distinctions in the law regulating military force.
Additionally, the very name of the operation - "Just Cause" - suggests
that there are more fundamental standards for judging the conduct of
6. It is frequently claimed that the U.S. Constitution is ill-suited for a 20th century military
superpower with world leadership responsibilities to enforce global peace. Former Secretary of State
Daniel Webster portrayed the national mission and leadership role somewhat differently: "Our true
mission is not to propagate our opinions or impose upon other countries our form of government
by artifice or force, but to teach by example and show by our success, moderation, and justice, the
blessings of self-government and the advantages of free institutions." 6 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 898 (John Bassett Moore ed., 1906) [hereinafter DIGEST].
7. See infra part IV.B.3.
8. The Weinberger Doctrine designates certain criteria to be used as guidelines when making
the decision of whether U.S. troops should be deployed overseas. See infra part V. However, this
doctrine is little more than a political test based on national interest. Id. One author assesses this
Doctrine as follows:
But whatever else one may think of the formula [Weinberger Doctrine] or its application
to this case [Operation Just Cause], it clearly has nothing to do with conventional legal
norms. Nor does it rest on any evident moral ones other than a kind of crude national
utilitarianism. Unlike the powerful Acquinian [sic] Just War paradigm, it requires no just
cause for the use of force.
Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 503, 514 (1990).
9. See infra part Il.C.
10. Bush Announces Invasion of Panama, in HISTORIC DOCUMENTS OF 1989 701 (Hoyt
Gimlin, ed., 1990) [hereinafter HISTORIC DOCUMENTS].
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nations than the dictates of social consensus or commands of positive
law. 0
The principle of jus cogens, or peremptory norm, is a well-
established principle of international law.1" It is a higher law than
treaty or custom based on state practice and cannot be altered by them.
Classic just war doctrine contains several legal elements, including just
cause, and each is a jus cogens governing the use of force in
international law. As such, just cause is not only a thread common to
internitional law, the U.S. Constitution and just war doctrine, it is the
thread that runs so true.
This article focuses on the unilateral use of force, with special
emphasis on the Panama Invasion of 1989. In the aftermath of Desert
Storm and the collapse of the Soviet Union, some international scholars
are optimistic that the world has entered an era when collective use of
force, as envisioned in the U.N. Charter, will be the rule and not the
exception. Multinational cooperation in numerous U.N. peacekeeping
and enforcement ventures sustains that hope.' 2 If indeed the future
belongs to the United Nations and monopolized use of force, there is
11. The principle is included in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 344.
Article 53, which is entitled Treaties Conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International
Law (Jus Cogens), states:
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm
of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory
norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international
community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and
which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.
Id. at 344.
The principle ofjus cogens presents considerable conceptual difficulties for most lawyers who
have been trained to live in a world of legal positivism. Since article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice seems to recognize only positive law, jtis cogens does not fit. STAT.
I.C.J., art. 38, reprinted in 1976 U.N.Y.B. 1043, U.N. Sales No. E.78.1.1. It is something that
exists but cannot quite be identified. A serious claim that it refers to a higher law evokes a mixed
reaction of scorn and fear.
12. Some believe that the last big change in the American idea came in the 1940s and that the
country is still run by an elite that views the world in terms of the Cold War era of superpowers.
Michael Vlahos, Our March Upcountry, MARINE CoRPs GAZErrE, Dec. 1993, at 20. When big
change comes the old elite are unable to adapt and a new elite emerge. Id. Exactly what the world
will look like is impossible to predict, but one thing is certain, it is those with a new and compelling
idea that will emerge. Id.
It may be that Desert Storm is the last hurrah of a world dominated by two superpowers
rather than the dawn of a new world order dominated by a single international organization. As
such, "[tihe classic American form [of a new idea] would be a great religious revival that would
wash away corruption in society. But that cleansing would surely frighten Europe's secular social
democrats and more surely split what was the West." Id. at 29.
JUST CAUSE
reason to question the utility of analyzing the legality of unilateral actions
or of revisiting Operation Just Cause. But just how effective the United
Nations has become, or is ever capable of becoming, should be
questioned, for it is at least as likely that the situations the United States
faces in the 21st century will call for unilateral use of force.
Consequently, Part II of the article summarizes the events leading
to the U.S. unilateral use of force in the invasion of Panama. Following
Part II, Operation Just Cause is analyzed in light of the requirements of
customary law, the U.S. Constitution, and the just war doctrine in Parts
III, IV and V, respectively. Finally, Part VI considers the positive
relation between law and sound policy decisions.
II. Case Study: The Invasion of Panama1 3
A. The Invasion
On December 20, 1989, a U.S. military force of 24,500 invaded
Panama and easily defeated the 15,000-man Panamanian Defense
Forces .14  U.S. casualties included twenty-three dead and 323
wounded. 5 The Pentagon estimated Panamanian deaths at 600, half of
them being civilians. 16  In addition, the attack left 15,000 people
homeless. Officials under the Bush Administration stated that the four
objectives of the attack were: (1) to protect American lives; (2) to
safeguard Panama Canal treaty rights; (3) to restore democratic
government; and (4) to put an end to drug trafficking by removing
General Manuel Noriega from power.'"
General Noriega, the "de facto" head of the Panamanian
government, had a 30-year symbiotic relationship with U.S. intelligence
and defense officials.' 9 In return for payments, Noriega supplied the
13. For a brief survey of U.S.-Panamanian relations since the early 20th century see Alan
Berman, In Mitigation of llegality: The U.S. Invasion of Panama, 79 KY. L.J. 735,736-39 (1991);
see also Charles Maechling, Jr., Washington's Illegal Invasion, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1990, at
113-115.
14. HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 701.
15. Id. at 703.
16. Id.
17. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LAWS OF WAR AND THE CONDUCT OF THE PANAMA
INVASION: AN AMERICAS WATCH REPORT 18 (1990).
18. H.R. DOC. NO. 127, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1990) (letter from President Bush notifying
Congress of the deployment of U.S. troops to Panama) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S LETTER]; BUREAU
OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, POL'Y No. 1240, PANAMA: A JUST CAUSE (1990)
(statement of T. Pickering, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations) [hereinafter
PICKERING STATEMENT].
19. HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 704.
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United States with information and cooperation in other matters, such as
supporting anti-Sandinista contra forces.' At some point, however, he
had become involved in criminal activities.2' His relationship with the
Medellin drug cartel had turned Panama into a drug distribution center.
As a result, the United States ended their relationship with Noriega, and
in February of 1988, charged him with various drug-related offenses in
two U.S. federal grand jury indictments.' While Panama is not
required to extradite its own nationals under an extradition treaty with
the United States, it is required to prosecute them.' Because General
Noriega was the de facto head-of-state, however, prosecution within
Panama was not possible.
The United States made various attempts to resolve the problem
without recourse to military action. Beginning in 1988, the United States
instituted a wide array of diplomatic, political, and economic pressures.
In particular, economic measures included a bar to military and economic
aid, a freeze on Panamanian assets, an order to place all debts in escrow,
a suspension of sugar imports, and a ban on Panamanian registered
ships. 2 The cumulative impact of these acts was to leave Panama in
economic ruin.' Other measures included portraying Noriega as evil
incarnate, offering to negotiate asylum in Europe, encouraging attempts
to overthrow him, and refusing to recognize his government or accept
any candidate he offered to serve as Canal Administrator.' The United
States also made unprecedented efforts to resolve the problem through
the Organization of American States (OAS). 27 Finally, the United
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 705. See also United States v. Noriega, 683 F. Supp. 1373 (S.D. Fla. 1988)
(charging Noriega with contributing to an international conspiracy to import cocaine into the United
States).
23. See Treaty Providing for the Extradition of Criminals, May 25, 1904, U.S.-Pan., art. 5,
34 Stat. 2851.
24. HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 702.
25. Id. See also The OAS and the Panama Crisis, 89 DEP'T ST. BULL. 67, 69 (1989) (Acting
Secretary of State's statements before the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
of the OAS on Aug. 24, 1989 and before the OAS Permanent Council on Aug. 31, 1989); U.S.
Severs Diplomatic Contact with Noriega Regime, 89 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 69 (1989) (President's
statement of Sept. 1, 1989); Economic Measures Against Panama, 89 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 69 (1989)
(Department statement of Sept. 12, 1989); U.S. Imposes Ban on Ships Under Panamanian Flag,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1989, at B2.
26. U.S. ST. DEP'T DOC. NO. 1815, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO RESOLVE THE
PANAMANIAN CRISIS 1-6 (1989); U.S. Severs Diplomatic Contact with Noriega Regime, supra note
25, at 69; Stephen Engleberg, Bush Aides Admit a U.S. Role in Coup, and'Bad Handling, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 6, 1989, at Al, Al0; Robert Pear, Aide to Noriega is Sworn in: U.S. Won't Recognize
Him, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1989, at A3.
27. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 2.
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States pressured Noriega himself to give up power and leave the
country. 2
At the same time the United States was attempting to peacefully rid
Panama of Noriega, Noriega was" engaged in his own campaign to harass
Americans and Panamanians who worked in the Canal Zone. In 1988,
under Noriega's command, detentions, threats, and intimidation of
American servicemen and their dependents became routine.2 9 The U.S.
claimed that there were 300 armed violations of U.S. bases, 400
detentions, and 140 persons endangered.3" In August 1989, the U.S.
reported 900 incidents of harassment in violation of the Canal treaties to
the Security Council.3' However, as late as November 1989, the State
Department reported that Panama had not interfered with actual
operations of the Canal and that Noriega had offered no direct threat to
operations or exercise of U.S. rights.32
In May of 1989, Panama held elections. 3 Observers claimed that
candidate Guillermo Endara won by an overwhelming margin. Noriega
responded by nullifying the election and having opposition candidates
physically beaten on television. 4 An attempted coup failed in 1989."5
Subsequently, Noriega had several of the coup leaders tortured and
executed.36 President Bush was criticized for not taking more decisive
measures in support of the coup.
The caldron finally boiled over on December 15, 1989, when the
Panamanian legislature declared that Panama was in a state of war with
the United States and then named Noriega its Maximum Leader.37
Thereafter, Noriega made public speeches probably designed to incite
violence against the 35,000 Americans living in Panama and said that he
looked forward to seeing American bodies floating in the Canal.38 At
28. Id.
29. PRESIDENTS LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 2.
30. PRESIDENT'S LETrER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 2.
31. PANAMA, UNITED STATES AGAIN BEFORE COUNCIL, U.N. CHRON., Dec. 1989, at 20.
32. STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE PANAMA CANAL, HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON
PANAMA CANAL AND OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT MARINE
& FISHERIES, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 52 (1989) (statement of Michael G. Kozak, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs).
33. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1; HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at705.
34. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1; HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 705.
35. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1; HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 705.
36. HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 705. See also Ann Devroy, U.S. Keeps Troops
on Sidelines, WASH. POST, Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, A3 1; David Hoffman & Joe Pichirallo, Rebels Held
Noriega for Hours, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 1989, at Al, A60; Russell Watson, The Invasion of
Panama, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 1, 1990, at 18.
37. PRESIDENT'S LETrER, supra note 16, at 1; HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 12, at 705.
38. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; William Branigin, Noriega Appointed 'Maximum
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first, the United States did not take this "declaration of war" seriously.
Yet, the next day Panamanian police killed an off-duty Marine officer
and wounded another that had been stopped at a roadblock. 39  The
Panamanian police also detained a Navy officer and his wife for several
hours beating him and threatening her with sexual abuse.' The United
States also claimed to have received evidence that Noriega was planning
commando raids on American residences.4' The information about the
commando raids was never confirmed. Further, such information was
not received until after December 17, when the decision to invade had
already been made.42 Panama claimed that none of the incidents in
which Americans were harmed were authorized, yetno apology was ever
made.43
The invasion commenced on December 20, just hours after Endara
was sworn in as the "legitimate" head-of-state.' Most of the fighting
was over in two days, but sporadic resistance continued for more days,
with looting breaking out in the capital.45 After a ten-day standoff,
Noriega surrendered himself on January 3, 1990 to the Papal
Nunciature.' Drug Enforcement Agency officials immediately brought
him to Florida.47 Panama City rejoiced upon news of Noriega's
capture.4
B. The Decision to Invade
Shortly before the invasion commenced on December 20, 1989,
President Bush informed Congressional leaders of his decision.49 On
December 21, 1989, he notified Congress of the invasion in an effort to
be "consistent with the War Powers Resolution."' The U.S. Senate
Leader', WASH. PoST, Dec. 16, 1989, at A21, A23.
39. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 704.
40. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 705-
706.
41. Watson, supra note 36, at 21.
42. Berman, supra note 13, at 751-52 (Press Conference by U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker on Dec. 20, 1989); Watson, supra note 36, at 21.
43. Andrew Rosenthal, President Calls Panama Slaying A Great Outrage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
19, 1989, at Al, A12.
44. Endara welcomed the invasion while he was protected on a U.S. military installation.
PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1.
45. HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 10, at 701, 702.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 702.
49. Id. at 706 (reprinting President Bush's televised address to the nation on Dec. 20, 1989).
50. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1. For more information on the War Powers
Resolution, see infra part IV.
JUST CAUSE
had debated the issue of military intervention on October 5, 1989, 51 and
on February 7, 1990, both the Senate and the House of Representatives
approved of the invasion by concurrent resolution.
5 2
Meanwhile, on December 20; 1989, the United States notified the
U.N. Security Council of its decision to invade.53 In response, the
U.N. Security Council drafted a resolution characterizing the invasion as
a flagrant violation of international law. Ten members voted for this
resolution and one abstained. The United States and three other
members vetoed the resolution.' The U.N. General Assembly adopted
a resolution condemning the invasion by a vote of 75 to 20, with 40
abstentions.55 Most of the opposing votes and abstentions were not
based on the belief that the U.S. invasion was legal, but rather that the
resolution failed to denounce Noriega's past conduct.5 6
On Decmeber 22, the United States also notified the O.A.S. of its
invasion. 57 The O.A.S. censured the United States for the invasion, by
a vote of 20 to 1 with 6 abstentions.
58
III. Just Cause and International Law
A. Customary International Law
The law of war governs both the decision to go to war, jus ad
bellum, and the manner in which war is waged, jus in bello.59 The
element of just cause pertains primarily to jus ad bellum. The
development of jus ad bellum was grounded in the just war doctrine of
Western Christianity. Yet, even when customary international law
became severed from its overtly biblical and theological moorings, it
nevertheless maintained the concept of just cause. Because customary
international law remained firmly established in the natural school of
jurisprudence, lawyers never viewed the law as simply a matter of
human convention. Properly understood, customary international law
reflects the immutable law of nature. 6°
51. Cong. Rec. S12684-01, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
52. H.R. Con. Res. 262, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
53. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
54. U.N. SCOR, 37 Sess., 2902d mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/5155 (1989).
55. U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 88th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/7976 (1989).
56. Berman, supra, note 13, at 735, 755.
57. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 2 (statement of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the OAS).
58. O.A.S. Doc. No. CP/Res.534 800/89 (1989). See also HISTORIC DOCUMENTS, supra note
10, at 703.
59. WILLIAM V. O'BRIEN, THE CONDUCT OF JUST AND LIMITED WAR 13 (1981).
60. See, e.g., VATrEL, supra note 1, at lviii ("We call that the Necessary Law of Nations
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There are three crucial concepts found in customary international
law as it relates to jus ad bellum. These concepts involve: (1) the
distinctions between offensive and defensive wars; (2) legal and
prudential judgments; and (3) state of war and act of war.
1. Offensive and Defensive Wars.-In assessing just causes of war,
the classic legal scholars determined that the legal cause of every just
war is an injury done to one nation by another.6" Injuries include any
unlawful attacks or other violations of rights that are identified by
international law.62 The kinds of injury giving rise to just cause are
therefore extremely numerous.63 As a result, there are three just and
lawful objectives for which nations wage war. These objectives include:
(1) obtaining compensation or reparations for losses; (2) punishing
offenders by reprisal for wrongs done; and (3) defending against
unlawful attacks.' Nations attain the first two objectives by resorting
to offensive war and the third by waging defensive war. An
understanding of the distinction between offensive and defensive war is
also critical for interpreting the U.N. Charter and the U.S. Constitution.
Following a finding of just cause, nations are permitted to wage
offensive war as a sanction to exact compensation for injuries and to
punish for wrongs. On the other hand, nations may wage just
defensive war without such findings in the event of an unlawful
attack.' Because there is no superior tribunal before which nations
may bring charges or complaints, they must necessarily be the judges of
their own cases.67
which consists in the application of the law of nature to Nations. It is Necessary because nations
are absolutely bound to observe it. This law contains the precepts prescribed by the law of nature
to States . . ."). Blackstone explained the prevailing 18th century understanding of the law of
nature as follows:
This law of nature, being coeval [sic] with mankind and dictated by God himself, is of
course superior in obligation to any other. It is binding over all of the globe in all
countries, and at all times; no human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and
such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority, mediately or
immediately, from this original.
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *41.
61. VATrEL, supra note 1, at 302.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Hugo Grotius listed the same three objectives of just wars: "Justifiable causes include
defence, the obtaining of that which belongs to us or is our due, and the inflicting of punishment."
2 HUGO GROTUs, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 171 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646).
65. VATTEL, supra note 1, at 302.
66. Id.
67. Although the International Court of Justice exists, nations seldom resort to it for a variety
of reasons. The 20th century has also witnessed many attempts to establish effective arbitration
JUST CAUSE
Before waging war, however, customary law does mandate that
countries abide by certain procedural requirements. These requirements
are based on the offensive-defensive war distinction. Customary
international law requires a declaration before waging offensive, but not
defensive, war.' The declaration must contain, or be preceded by,
notice of cause and a demand for satisfaction for the injury suffered.69
The purpose of such notice is to give the offender a final opportunity to
settle matters peacefully.7' In addition, the declaration may serve to
notify one's own citizens of changes in legal relations or obligations.7'
Consequently, the declaration of war is in effect a legal judgment in
cases of offensive war. 72
The normal domestic legal system makes a similar distinction
between offensive and defensive use of force.' Only after a judicial
judgment may the state punish criminals or exact compensation. 74
However, an individual or the state may use force in self-defense without
prior judicial authorization 'as long as there is an immediate threat to
person or property. 75
2. Legal and Prudential Judgments.-Just because a nation has just
cause does not mean that it should wage war. The decision to wage war
entails both a legal judgment that there is just cause and a prudential
judgment that war is in the national interest. A prudential or political
judgment is founded on utility. Not only must the state have a legal
right, it must be advisable and expedient to exercise that right. It would
be unlawful and therefore immoral to wage war solely on national
interest without just cause. Also, it would be imprudent and therefore
immoral to wage war contrary to national interest even if there is just
cause. This concept is described as follows:
The reasons which may determine [states] to [wage war] are of two
classes. Those of the one class show that [a state] has a right to
tribunals.
68. VArEL, supra note 1, at 315, 316.
69. Id. at 314.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 314-16.
72. In fact, up to the beginning of the 20th century, the resort to war was considered an
extraordinary form of a lawsuit. "A large number of writers described war as a judicial procedure
involving also execution and punishment; it was looked upon as the 'litigation of nations', a means
of obtaining redress for wrongs in the absence of a system of international justice and sanctions."
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 21 (1963).
73. See infra part III.A.3.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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make war - that [a state] has just grounds for undertaking it: -
these are called justificatory reasons [legal judgments]. The others,
founded on fitness and utility, determine whether it be expedient for
the sovereign to undertake a war, - these are called motives
[prudential judgments] .76
Under international law,, the right to initiate war resides only in the
public authority who is responsible for making both the legal and
prudential judgment." However, allocation of war powers within a
state is a matter of domestic law. Although the authority to make both
judgments may reside in the same person or body, it may be allocated in
some other fashion. 8
The classical international law commentaries discuss several
additional legal and prudential requirements that decisionmakers must
follow to insure that they waged war justly. For example, authorities
must have proper motives for waging war and not do so upon pretext.
Also, war is to be waged as a last resort when every other means of
settling disputes peacefully has been exhausted. Perhaps most important,
any punishment or reparations must be proportionate to the wrong
done.79
3. State of War and Act of War.-When considering the concept of
just cause within customary international law, one must finally consider
the distinction between act of war and state of war. This distinction is
implicit in the requirement that the amount of force used must be
proportionate to the injury suffered. This precept has been articulated as
follows:
In reality the word "war" comprehends two meanings. It denotes (1)
acts of war, and (2) the international condition of things called a
"state of war." Acts of war do not always or necessarily develop
76. VATrEL, supra note 1, at 301. Vattel uses the word "motive" to refer to prudential
considerations:
As the nation, or her ruler, ought, in every undertaking, not only to respect justice,
but also to keep in view the advantage of the state, it is necessary that proper and
commendable motives [prudential judgments] should concur with the justificatory reasons
[legal judgments], to induce a determination to embark in a war. These reasons show
that the sovereign has a right to take up arms, that he has just cause to do so. The
proper motives show, that in the present case it is advisable and expedient to make use
of his right. These latter relate to prudence, as the justificatory reasons come under the
head of justice.
Id. at 303.
77. VATrEL, supra note 1, at 292; GROTIUS, supra note 64, at 91-137.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 303-06.
JUST CAUSE
into the general international condition of things called a state of war,
but they are nevertheless war and involve the "making" of war in a
legal sense.'
The distinction between state of war and act of war is important to
both offensive and defensive war, but in somewhat different ways.
Defensive war is waged in response to either an unjust act of war or an
unjust initiation of a state of war."' In neither situation does
international law require a declaration of war, however, because
defensive war is waged in response to an immediate threat or ongoing
attack.' In essence, then, the right to wage defensive war exists where
"'the necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.'"83 When unjust
acts of war are relatively discrete incidents not developing into, or being
part of a state of war, defensive force may be used as long as the threat
or attack is immediate.' 4 Once the danger has passed, redress may be
had through resort to a proportionate offensive act of war if peaceful
means are unsuccessful in obtaining justice.' This concept is very
similar to the doctrine of self-defense in domestic law. A person may
use proportionate force against an immediate threat or attack. Once
damage has been done and the immediate threat is past, remedial action
must be pursued in court. With unjust initiations of a state of war,
however, the immediate threat or attack is continuous.A6 Therefore,
wronged parties may still respond with defensive force without a
declaration of war.A7
80. 5 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE 195 (1944)
[hereinafter 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSE'rr MOORE]. There have been numerous forms
of coercion not amounting to a "state of war" including "reprisals, pacific blockades, certain
justifiable interventions, and naval demonstrations." BROWNLE, supra note 72, at 26. The 19th
and 20th centuries have also witnessed the use of a wide variety of terms to refer to hostilities of
a lesser nature than state of war including "'war', 'actual warfare', 'de facto state of war',
'intervention', 'armed intervention', 'hostilities', 'expedition', 'military measures', and 'war-like
acts'." Id. at 34. "They [types of force used for limited purpose] also share other characteristics
related to the limited objective of the operations: in each case the conflict is limited in geographical
terms or in the numbers of the forces involved, or in both senses." Id. at 40.
81. See supra part MI.A.I.
82. Id.
83. 2 DIGEST, supra note 6, § 217. Although this standard was formulated for anticipatory
attacks, it seems that it covers ongoing attacks as well. All self-defense is in some sense
anticipatory. Nicholas Rostow, Nicaragua and the Law of Self-Defense Revisited, 11 YALE J. INT'L
L. 437, 452 n.59 (1986).
84. 2 DIGEST, supra note 6, § 217.
85. VATTEL, supra note 1, at 305.
86. 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN BASSETT MOORE, supra note 80, at 195.
87. VA-rTEL, supra note 1, at 305.
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Offensive war, like the judgment of a civil court, must be
proportionate to the wrong done.88 If an enemy initiates an unjust state
of war, which by its very nature involves an immediate and ongoing
threat or attack, any response will be defensive from the victim's
perspective. 9 Since the victim is acting in self-defense, no declaration
of war is necessary as a matter of international law.' Therefore, just
offensive war will invariably be waged to vindicate a prior unjust act of
war. When an unjust attack is only an act of war, normally only an
offensive act of war in response will be proportionate. The purpose of
a declaration in such a case will not be to initiate a state of war, but
rather an act of war. These declarations should place limits on the use
of force to ensure that it is proportionate to the wrong done. Placing
clear limits on the use of force will also satisfy prudential concerns."
That is, if friendly forces and the enemy know that actions are to be
limited, they will tend to prevent greater hostilities from ensuing. 92
88. See supra part I.A. 1.
89. See supra text accompanying note 83.
90. See supra part I.A.1.
91. See supra part III.A.2.
92. During the 18th and 19th centuries many states promoted the view that the decision to
initiate war is a purely political matter not governed by law. BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 14, 19-
20, 41, 47. Even so, nations were reluctant to go to war without claiming what amounted to just
cause. MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC
ORDER: THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 135 (1961).
However, that view recognized, for the most part, that the way in which combatants wage
war is subject tojus in bello. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. The London Charter and
judgments of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg following World War II emphatically
rejected the theory that there is no jus ad bellum. Trial of the Major War Criminals, I I.M.T. 1,
186 (1947) (Int'l Mil. Trib.). The allies tried, convicted and executed civilian and military leaders
of Nazi Germany on charges including crimes against peace. Id. at 216-18. The Tribunal declared
that "[t]o initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime, it is the supreme
international crime.. .. " Id. at 186. The exact legal theory relied upon to justify the Nuremberg
convictions for crimes against peace is unclear. The International Military Tribunal found that the
Charter which created the Tribunal and defined the crime was decisive. Id. at 218. This is an
unsatisfactory rationale and bears a striking resemblance to the positivistic approach the German
jurists took at their trials. They argued that in punishing Germans who aided Jews they were simply
applying the law of Nazi Germany. However, even if customary law forbidding aggressive war had
disappeared by the early 20th century, it was reconstituted following World War I, as prohibitions
against aggressive war in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Treaty that
was almost universally accepted. BROWNLIE, supra, note 72, at 56, 66, 107, 112, 216, 274.
There was a revival of natural law thought following World War II to counter the legal
positivism that had become so prevalent in this century and so foundational to National Socialism.
Unless there is a higher law governing nations that gives content to international law independent
of treaty and custom, the law of the Nuremberg Tribunal is truly nothing more than "victor's
justice" in the crassest sense.
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B. The United Nations Charter
The U.N. Charter radically alters customary law by denying nations
the right to unilateral use of offensive force as a remedy for injuries."
Considerable controversy exists as to whether the right of self-defense is
narrower under the Charter than under customary law. Under the U.N.
Charter, the issue of unilateral use of force is embodied in two
provisions, namely article 2(4) and article 51.
Article 2(4) establishes the basic rule prohibiting all unilateral force.
Article 2(4) provides that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."' The
Charter further provides that member states delegate to the Security
Council the right to determine whether there is "any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression. "I In addition to assessing
threats, the Security Council alone has the authority to decide whether
to use force or some other form of action to remedy matters.'
Article 51 is the only U.N. Charter provision that recognizes an
exception to the general prohibition on unilateral force. As enunciated
by article 51:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-
defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and
shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such
action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security. 9
93. But cf., BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 281. Author Ian Brownlie argues that by 1945,
customary law had already changed so as to disallow unilateral use of offensive force.
94. U.N. Charter art. 2, 1 4.
95. Id. art. 39. Article 39 provides that "[t]he Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security." Id.
96. Id. arts. 40-42.
97. Id. art. 51.
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Article 51 imposes a procedural requirement to notify the Security
Council of measures taken in self-defense. This requirement does not
exist under customary law.98
There is also disagreement over whether the right to self-defense
acknowledged by article 51 is narrower than that recognized in
customary law. This disagreement is primarily focused on the meaning
of two phrases in article 51, namely the phrases "inherent right . . . of
self-defence" and "if an armed attack occurs." Arguably, "inherent
right" refers to customary law, thereby making article 51's right of self-
defense identical to the customary right.' However, some scholars
argue that the language "if an armed attack occurs" limits the right of
self-defense to actual large-scale attacks across territorial borders."
98. Some diplomats and scholars have argued that the right of unilateral self-defense ceases
once the Security Council has taken any measure to restore peace or once an invasion is complete.
For example, once the invasion of Kuwait was complete or following Security Councils sanctions
on Iraq short of war, Kuwait had no right to use force in self-defense. E.g., Kathryn S. Elliott, The
New World Order and the Right of Self-Defense in the United Nations Charter, 15 HASTINGS INT'L
& CoMP. L. REv. 55 (1991). But cf., Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article 51: Limits on Self-Defense?
13 MIcH. J. INT'L L. 336 (1992).
99. There are several difficulties here. The first is determining whether "inherent right" is a
reference to customary law based simply on state practice and opinio juris (the classic writers
referred to this as permissive law) or whether it includes the law of nature. If it is only permissive
law, to what does it refer? Is it customary law as it stood in 1945 or as it stands today? If
"inherent" simply refers to custom as human convention or permissive law it gives no assurance of
a basic immutable right. Classic scholar Grotius had this to say about such views of law and
justice:
The delusion is as old as it is detestable with which many men, especially those who
by their wealth and power exercise the greatest influence, persuade themselves, or as I
rather believe, try to persuade themselves, that justice and injustice are distinguished the
one from the other not by their own nature, but in some fashion merely by the opinion
and the custom of mankind.
HUGO GROTIUS, FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 1 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., 1916) (1608).
However, if "inherent" is given its normal meaning as something that cannot be changed by
custom or treaty it is a meaningful concept. But then it points to a law that precedes and is unaltered
by human convention. Oscar Schachter recognizes these two fundamentally opposed approaches to
law.
While acknowledging that the concept "inherent right" has natural law origins,
many authorities on international law reject the idea that the right of self-defense exists
independently of positive law and cannot be altered by it .... However, the fact that
the Court and international legal scholars consider that self-defense is governed by
positive law has not obliterated an opposing conception of self-defense as an autonomous,
nonderogable right that "exists" independently of legal rules. That conception, I believe,
continues to influence popular and official attitudes concerning national security.
Oscar Schachter, SelfDefense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259, 259-60 (1989)
[hereinafter Self-Defense and the Rule of Law].
100. [B]ut self-defence now has a more restricted and obvious meaning. For at
least thirty years it has appeared in state practice principally, though not
exclusively, as a reaction to the use of force against the territorial domain, the
physical entity, of a state.
JUST CAUSE
This interpretation would preclude the right of anticipatory self-defense
and humanitarian rescues even of one's own nationals.'°'
The International Court of Justice addressed the right of self-defense
in Nicaragua v. United States," when it made a distinction between
"armed attack" and other illegal uses of force." In Nicaragua, the
court held that there is an individual and collective right of self-defense,
which includes the right to counterattack"° against an armed attack.
Additionally, the Court held that there is at least an individual right to
take "proportionate counter-measures" against other illegal use of
force." s "Proportionate counter-measures" seems to imply the use of
force. The factors distinguishing armed attacks from other illegal uses
of force are the scale and effect of the attack. 11 As noted by the
Court:
An armed attack is not merely action by regular armed forces across
an international border, but also "the sending by or on behalf of a
State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry
out acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to
amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack conducted by regular
forces, "or its substantial involvement therein" . . . . [However it
does not include] assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of
weapons or logistical or other support. Such assistance may be
BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 255-56. Brownlie also discusses issues of size and extent of the attack
as well as attack by indirect means. Id. at 278-79. See also Self-Defense and the Rule of Law,
supra note 99, at 272 ('Nearly all the cases have been discussed in UN bodies and, although
opinions have been divided, it is clear that most governments have been reluctant to legitimize
expanded self-defense actions that go beyond the paradigmatic case [of armed attack on the territory
or instrumentality of the state]").
101. As to the issue of anticipatory self-defense see BROWNUE, supra note 72, at 366-67 ("In
particular the terms of article 51 of the Charter would seen to preclude preventive action."). But
see, Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1633-35
(1984) [hereinafter The Right of States to Use Armed Force]. "It is... not implausible to interpret
article 51 as leaving unimpaired the right of self-defense as it existed prior to the Charter." Id. at
1634.
As to the right of humanitarian intervention to protect one's own nationals Brownlie writes:
"In spite of the important instances since 1920 of use of this justification and the views of a
considerable number of jurists, it is submitted that any legal basis of the right of intervention is now
extremely tenuous." BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 298. But Schachter claims that most countries
recognize the right to rescue their own nationals. The Right of States to Use Armed Force, supra,
at 1628-33.
102. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
103. Id. at 127. "Nevertheless, such activities may well constitute a breach of the principle of
the non-use of force and an intervention in the internal affairs of a State, that is, a form of conduct
which is certainly wrongful, but is of lesser gravity than an armed attack." Id.
104. Id. at 102-03, 110.
105. Id. at 106, 127.
106. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 103-04.
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regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the
internal or external affairs of other States. °0
Accordingly, based upon Nicaragua, in cases of armed attack, a
victim may unilaterally or collectively use force in self-defense, including
armed counterattacks or intervention into the offender's territory. 108
The victim of other illegal uses of force may use "proportionate counter-
measures."" °  The Court declined to say whether counter-measures
could be taken in the offender's territory. I0 However, it did rule that
third parties may not intervene in the offender's territory with counter-
measures in exercise of a right analogous to collective self-defense. The
implication is that the victim may not intervene with forcible counter-
measures either. "
The Court claimed to decide Nicaragua on the basis of customary
international law rather than the U.N. Charter." 2  The court stated that
the right of self-defense as expressed in the Charter is not identical to
customary law,'' 3 but neither is it inconsistent. 114
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 110.
110. As stated by the Court:
However, since the Court is bound to confine its decision to those points of law which
are essential to the settlement of the dispute before it, it is not for the Court here to
determine what direct reactions are lawfully open to a State which considers itself the
victim of another State's acts of intervention, possibly involving the use of force. Hence
it has not to determine whether, in the event of Nicaragua's having committed any such
acts against El Salvador, the latter was lawfully entitled to take any particular counter-
measure.
Id. at 110. If forcible countermeasures in the offender's territory are illegal, this would constitute
a significant departure from the "inherent" right of self-defense. It is not unlikely that the I.C.J.
would make such a departure. Its analysis of "armed attack" follows very closely that of Brownlie:
Since the phrase 'armed attack' strongly suggests a trespass it is very doubtful if it
applies to the case of aid to revolutionary groups and forms of annoyance which do not
involve offensive operations by the forces of a state. Sporadic operations by armed bands
would also seem to fall outside the concept of 'armed attack.' However, it is conceivable
that a co-ordinated and general campaign by powerful bands of irregulars, with obvious
or easily proven complicity of the government of a state from which they operate, would
constitute an 'armed attack' ....
BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 278-79. Brownlie, who served as Nicaragua's Agent and Counsel in
Nicaragua, also wrote that, "[i]ndirect aggression and the incursions of armed bands can be
countered by measures of defence which do not involve military operations across frontiers." Id.
at 279.
111. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 110. "In the view ofthe Court, under international law in force
today-whether customary international law or that of the United Nations system-States do not have
a right of 'collective' armed response to acts which do not constitute an 'armed attack.'" Id.
112. Id. at 94-96.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 94, 96.
JUST CAUSE
It is also unclear to what extent the U.N. Charter and other treaties
may have altered the content of pre-Charter customary law. The Court
said that "inherent right" must refer to customary law that has a prior
and independent existence from the Charter, yet that customary law
might be affected or altered by the Charter."5 However, it would be
impossible to know what current customary law is by simply asking what
it was prior to the Charter of 1945.16 For example, even though there
was clearly a customary right of anticipatory self-defense prior to 1945,
that customary right may not be the same today. There is no evidence
of a pre-1945 custom that makes a distinction allowing collective
intervention in response to armed attack but not in response to other
illegal use of force. Unfortunately, the Court offered no evidence of
how this distinction arose in state practice since 1945.
Nonetheless, the "inherent right" of self-defense has an existence
independent of custom or treaty. Customary law as it existed prior to the
U.N. Charter incorporated and reflected that immutable right.
C. Operation Just Cause and International Law
The Bush Administration relied on two basic legal theories to justify
the invasion of Panama. The primary theory was the U.N. Charter's
article 51 right of self-defense."' Three of the invasion's objectives,
including protecting American lives, safeguarding treaty rights, and
stopping drug trafficking, are tied to this justification. The second
theory relied on was the right of humanitarian intervention."' The
fourth objective, establishing democracy in Panama, is based on the
second theory. Nevertheless, the arguments that the invasion was a
lawful act of self-defense or an act of humanitarian intervention are
unconvincing. Likewise, the invasion was unlawful under customary
law. Although the United States had just cause it did not meet other
requirements for just war.
115. The Court therefore finds that Article 51 of the Charter is only meaningful on
the basis that there is a "natural" or "inherent" right of self-defence, and it
is hard to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its
present content has been confirmed and influenced by the Charter.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 94. Of course under this interpretation, "natural" and "inherent" really
have no fixed meaning at all. When rights are simply the creation of a political sovereign or
communal consensus they offer no protection. See supra text accompanying note 99.
116. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at 95, 96-97.
117. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1.
118. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1-2; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
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1. Operation Just Cause as Self-defense
(a) The U.N. Charter.-The U.S. invasion of Panama cannot
be justified as self-defense against an armed attack as that right was
defined by the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
States. The United States appealed to three basic facts in justifying the
invasion as self-defense. First, Noriega waged a harassment and
intimidation campaign against Americans and U.S. military bases." 9
Second, Noriega declared that Panama was in a state of war with the
United States and encouraged violence against Americans."Z° Finally,
Noriega's police killed an off-duty Marine officer at a roadblock in front
of his office building and wounded another.' They also arrested and
abused a Navy couple who witnessed the shooting."Z Actions ordered
or condoned by Noriega, and directed at Americans, certainly amounted
to an illegal use of force, but they were not of sufficient magnitude to be
characterized as an armed attack. '2
The United States was free to use proportionate countermeasures,
including perhaps forcible ones, against any illegal use of force, but, in
Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice left undecided the question
of whether the victim may intervene in the offender's territory to do
so. 24  Under the most likely interpretation, the victim may not
intervene with forcible .countermeasures. The Panama situation,
however, presented special problems. American military personnel and
civilians were in Panama under treaty rights and to a large measure
mixed in with the Panamanian community.11 Certainly measures
limited in scope and effect as an immediate response to illegal acts were
permitted in Panamanian territory under these circumstances. However,
119. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
120. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
121. PRESIDENT'S LErER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
122. PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1; PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
.123. It might be argued that Panama declared war on the United States, thereby placing the
United States in a state of war and justifying an invasion as an act of self-defense. See supra part
III.A.3. There are several problems with this argument. Words alone do not create a state of war
any more than the absence of a declaration means there is no state of war regardless of objective
reality. Certainly there was no state of war in Panama. The United States did not take the matter
seriously when the "declaration" was made. The language of the "declaration" indicated little more
than the fact that Noriega properly perceived that he was under a great deal of pressure to give up
power.
124. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
125. Ruth Wedgwood, The Use of Armed Force in International Affairs: Self-Defense and the
Panama Invasion, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 609, 610-11 (1991). This article contains factual
information not found in most other articles on the Panama invasion. In the author's opinion, it is
also the most evenhanded analysis of the factual material relating to self-defense.
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the U.S. invasion went beyond the limits of proportionate acts of self-
defense or countermeasures and amounted to offensive operations.
One of the biggest problems under the U.N. Charter has been the
propensity of states to engage in offensive acts while claiming they are
acting in self-defense."2 The International Court of Justice, in making
a distinction between armed attack and other illegal use of force,
attempted to set clear limits on these expansive redefinitions of self-
defense while still allowing states to respond to very clear, serious and
immediate danger."Z Even though the particular consequences of the
distinction the court makes between armed attack and other illegal use of
force is not supported by customary law, it does seem roughly analogous
to the distinction customary law made between state of war and act of
war. " A state of war is most closely associated with an illegal
invasion amounting to a large-scale and continuous state of hostilities that
is easily identified. 29 The Court seems to state that it is an invasion-
like breach of the peace that is required to constitute an armed
attack. 130
Acts of war, on the other hand, can be somewhat self-contained in
terms of scale and effect, and they are most likely limited in time and
space.' For these reasons, acts of war are akin to other illegal uses
of force. Examples include clashes at sea or border incidents. Under
customary law, those involved are entitled to defend themselves, and if
the danger comes directly from within another state's borders, the
threatening entity shoiuld be a fair target.' The event should not
provide a pretext for reprisals, but rather, it should justify the amount
and type of force necessary to defend oneself.'33 The problem with
equating "armed attack" in article 51 with invasion-type attacks is that
it limits the inherent right of self-defense against small-scale attacks.'
126. "In fact, the records of the Security Council are replete with cases where states have
invoked self-defence in this broader sense but where the majority of the Council have rejected this
classification and regarded their. action as unlawful reprisals." Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving
Recqurse toArmed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 4 (1972). This same phenomenon occurred prior
to the U.N. Charter when attempts were made to outlaw the offensive use of force through the
Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy. BROWNLIE,
supra note 72, at 90.
127. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
128. Id.
129. See supra part Ill.A.3.
130. See supra notes 102-116 and accompanying text.
131. See supra part III.A.3.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Brownlie gives an example:
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(b) Customary law.-Even if Panama's actions did not
constitute an armed attack, the United States seemed to invoke the right
of anticipatory self-defense, 35  which customary international law
clearly recognizes.'36 There is no need for a country to wait until it
has actually been attacked if the danger of attack is "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment of
deliberation." 37  The Bush Administration argued that there was such
a drastic danger of armed attack in Panama. Of course, it is impossible
to prove Noriega's intent with absolute certainty. His statements days
before the invasion likely heightened tensions and contributed to the
behavior of his police. However, his entire course of activity over two
years seemed calculated not to give rise to a serious incident that could
be used to excuse an American invasion. An argument relying on
anticipatory self-defense is therefore very weak.
Arguably, the simple distinction between the customary concepts of
act of war and state of war do not comport with the nature of most
modern warfare. For example, in modem times, countries are faced
with sporadic but recurring acts of war, such as terrorism, indirect
aggression, such as aid to rebels, or a very low level of continuous
conflict, such as a harassment campaign. These may drag on for years
without amounting to an armed attack. Consequently, questions remain
as to whether a state may only respond interminably to immediate threats
or violence without going further to attack the source of the problem.
Under the U.N. Charter, the Security Council is responsible for taking
up and resolving these matters, but obviously that will not happen. 3 '
These kinds of illegal activity are the deliberate policy of some states
who know they cannot win a direct confrontation with the United States.
They are designed to wear down an opponent without provoking a
significant response.'39
Some difficulty arises in the case of repeated attacks on shipping from a land base. If
forces from the flag state counter-attack or intercept over territorial waters or territory
of the source of attack it is possible to argue that iipingement of territorial sovereignty
and integrity is not a proportionate reaction to attack on shipping.
BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 305. This is a strange doctrine of proportionality to suggest that
military forces are immune to counterattack so long as they stay in their own territory and engage
in relatively low levels of hostility.
135. PICKERING STATEMENT, supra note 18, at 1-2; PRESIDENT'S LETTER, supra note 18, at 1.
Both claim that Americans were in "imminent danger."
136. VATrEL, supra note 1, at 307-14; BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 258-61; see also The Right
of States to Use Armed Force, supra note 101, at 1633-35.
137. See 2 DIGEST, supra note 83, § 217.
138. See supra part III.B.
139. R. Lynn Rylander, The Future of Marines in Small Wars, 40 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 64
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This sort of situation, however, is not unique to the 20th century.
Some of the United States' earliest security problems involved low
intensity conflicts. For example, in the early 1800s Tripoli attacked
American ships for not paying tribute, and even declared war on the
United States." President Jefferson sent a small squadron of frigates
to the Mediterranean with orders to protect American commerce.' 4 '
He then reported an ensuing incident:
One of the Tripolitan cruisers having fallen in with and engaged the
small schooner Enterprise... was captured, after a heavy slaughter
of her men, without the loss of a single one on our part ...
Unauthorized by the Constitution, without the sanction of Congress,
to go beyond the line of defense, the vessel, being disabled from
committing further hostilities, was liberated with its crew. The
Legislature will doubtless consider whether, by authorizing measures
of offense also, they will place our force on an equal footing with
that of its adversaries. 42
The U.S. Navy acted in self-defense against an act of war, but once the
danger was past, the United States did not carry the war further. Any
such action would have constituted a reprisal or offensive act.
Because unilateral reprisals are unlawful under the U.N. Charter,
nations frequently engage in these acts under the guise of self-defense.
The major problem, beside the dishonesty involved, is that nations then
forego the requirements of customary law, including declarations of war,
that are designed to settle disputes peacefully. 143  No nation will
declare war today because such action would be considered a prima facie
case of an illegal offensive war.'" Such a result also discourages
negotiations because, if a nation delays a counterattack, it is harder to
argue that it was in response to an immediate danger.1"s
(1987).
140. ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE
ORIGINS 208-14 (1976) [hereinafter WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSrITLONAL POWER];
FRANCIS D. WoRMUTH & EDWIN B. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 23-25 (1986).
141. WoRMUTH & FIRMAGE, supra note 140, at 23-25.
142. AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: NAVAL AFFAIRS (1860), quoted in WORMUTH & FIRMAGE,
supra note 140, at 23-24.
143. Philip Marshall Brown, Undeclared Wars, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 538, 540 (1939). The
Treaty Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (Kellogg Pact)
in outlawing offensive use of force also contributed to wars without declarations of war. Id. at 540.
Brown states, "[ilt is necessary, however, to stress the lamentable and unforeseen consequence of
the Kellogg Pact in encouraging aggressor nations hypocritically to avoid any formal declaration of
war in order to elude the constraints of this pious declaration." Id.
144. See supra part I.A.3.
145. Id.
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Consequently, nations are left to pursue two courses of action to
deal with these low intensity conflicts under the rubric of self-defense.
One way is to counter these conflicts with similar conduct, as occurred
in Panama, such as conducting covert operations or returning
harassment. In Panama, the United States made veiled threats against
Noriega's regime, encouraged coups, and conducted military exercises
designed to intimidate the existing government. 14' The other course is
to promote a relatively small incident as a very big attack that merits
immediate retaliation. In either case, the self-defense justification is
severely strained.
The cumulation of Noriega's wrongs was great. He targeted
Americans for abuse, violated treaty agreements and engaged in an
extensive conspiracy to break U.S. laws. The United States suffered
injury and had just cause to wage offensive war against Noriega.
However, the U.N. Charter precluded that option. 47 Customary law
forbids engaging in offensive war except as a last resort and after a
declaration of war. The appropriate U.S. response under customary law
would have been to issue a conditional declaration of war setting out the
just cause basis, demanding satisfaction, and giving an ultimatum.'48
Customary law requires good faith diplomatic efforts to settle matters
peacefully. In the situation with Panama, this was extremely difficult to
do since the United States basically refused to deal with Noriega. Had
these procedures been followed it is quite possible Noriega would have
left peacefully. The U.N. Charter denies the unilateral right of reprisals
on the premise that this denial reduces the risk of wars.' 49 In this case,
however, the preclusion of reprisal probably would have increased the
risk of war.
Several writers have noted the phenomenon of nations resorting
regularly to reprisals under the cloak of self-defense.' 50 Some have
developed theories to openly give reprisals a color of legality.' They
146. From President Bush's perspective, all these efforts failed to accomplish their goal. See
PICKERING'S STATEMENT, supra note 16, at 1.
147. Kidnapping as an alternative to extradition is generally considered to be a violation of
international law. It might seem that the invasion of a country to arrest its leader is an extremely
aggravated form of kidnapping. If violation of U.S. law with a resulting failure to extradite or
prosecute is a legal wrong then offensive force is justified under customary law to rectify the
situation. The most proportionate use of force would be to arrest the one responsible. Certainly,
that is preferable to collective punishment of a nation.
148. See supra part III.A.1.
149. See supra part III.B.
150. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in
Paradigms, 27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1990); W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination:
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argue that since the Charter's use of force provisions have fallen into a
virtual state of desuetude and the Security Council has not lived up to its
responsibilities, the prohibition on unilateral offensive force is no longer
binding. 152  In part, the argument is also based on changed
circumstances. Without the Soviet Union, reprisals are less likely to
provoke a major war. In effect, this argument is one advocating
customary substantive norms without customary procedures. The failure
of the United Nations, together with the de facto practice of unilateral
reprisals cannot be simply attributed to the fact that states cling to a
world system based on national sovereignty and national interest. The
U.N. scheme is a failure because it violates jus cogens. It denies nation-
states their essential reason for existence, which is to do justice.
Additionally, it attempts to centralize military power which historically
has been a precursor for totalitarianism.
This subterfuge, by which offensive force is simply denominated as
defensive, is illustrated even more clearly in U.S. Ambassador
Pickering's defense of the U.S. invasion of Panama before the Security
Council.
There is another issue at stake in this debate over Panama-the
disgrace, the terrible evil of drug trafficking ....
This is a war as deadly and as dangerous as any fought with
armies massed across borders; the survival of democratic nations is
at stake.
Countries that provide safe haven and support for the
international drug trafficking cartels menace the peace and security
just as surely as if they were using their own conventional military
forces to attack our societies. . . That is aggression. It is
aggression against us all, and now it is being brought to an end. 53
Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984).
152. See Arend, supra note 151, at 40; see also Reisman, supra note 151, at 643.
153. PICKERING STATEMENT, supria, note 18, at 2. Of course one could carry the implications
of this analogy further. Those American's who support the enemy by engaging in drug trafficking
or use should be tried for treason.
The practice of interpreting the right of "self-defense" in an extremely expansive manner is
not unique to the U.N. Charter system. What amounts to reprisals may be called "self-defense"
because offensive force is used to defend one's right. Anything that promotes the national interest
defends one's way of life. Other terms used almost synonymously with self-defense in a broad sense
are self-preservation, necessity, vital national interest, self-protection and self-help. Defining self-
defense in this manner obliterates any meaningful standard for distinguishing offensive from
defensive war or war based on just cause (a legal standard) from war based solely on national
interest (a political standard). See BROWNLIE, supra note 72, at 41-43, 48, 240, 244, 249, 253, 261,
291.
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It is difficult to tell whether this is a legal argument under the
Charter's article 51 or simply a rhetorical device designed to gain
political support. It is certainly plausible to argue that drugs are one of
the greatest problems in the United States. Foreign states that harbor
criminals in violation of international law, or worse yet engage in drug
trafficking, should not be immune from armed sanctions employed in
accordance with customary law. In the case of Panama, drug trafficking
caused injury to the United States, but it certainly did not amount to an
armed attack under either the U.N. Charter or customary law.
2. Operation Just Cause as Humanitarian Intervention .- The Bush
administration offered humanitarian intervention as a secondary theory
to justify the invasion. The term has been used in practice to describe
three fairly different situations. Arguably, the term refers to the rescue
of one's own citizens held hostage in a foreign country.1 4 At least one
writer believes that, since American citizens were in danger there, the
invasion of Panama was a "humanitarian rescue."' However, when
the hostages are one's own citizens, if indeed they are hostages, such a
rescue seems more akin to self-defense, and therefore, has a more solid
ground of legality.' 6
A second use of the term "humanitarian intervention" refers to
intervention in a foreign state to prevent human rights violations against
foreign nationals.'57  This principle was not well-established in
customary international law, and until the United States went into
Somalia, this principle was rarely relied upon.5 8 While there is a
strong humanitarian impulse to do something in such cases, world
opinion usually views intervention skeptically.' 9 Widespread serious
human rights violations were apparently not among Noriega's faults, at
least as compared to many other contemporary states.
The third use of the term "humanitarian intervention" refers to
intervention for the purpose of establishing democracy, freedom, self-
154. Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under International
Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494, 496-97 (1990).
155. Id.
156. See supra part III.A, III.B.
157. Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for
Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 229 (John Norton
Moore ed., 1974); Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE
MODERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974) [hereinafter Humanitarian Intervention].
158. Lillich, supra note 157, at 229; Humanitarian Intervention, supra note 157, at 217.
159. See Diana Jean Schemo, U.S. Attacks Rebels in Somalia: Marine is Slain Later, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, at A12.
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determination or other political goals." This purpose was in part the
basis for U.S. intervention in Panama. However, the U.N. Charter does
not make any exception to the prohibition on unilateral force for these
purposes. Nor did such humanitarian concerns provide just cause for
intervention under customary law. Indeed, the major thrust of the U.N.
Charter is to restrict, not promote, unilateral force.
A variant of this third use of the term is "counterintervention," a
concept vigorously supported by advocates in the Reagan
Administration.' 6' What came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine
was formulated to respond to illegal communist intervention that toppled
"democratic" governments. 62 Where there was an illegal intervention
to establish communism, the United States could supposedly counter the
intervention to support democratic factions. 63 It thus became known
as "counterintervention." ' 4 The invasion of Panama could not be
justified as "counterintervention." Noriega did not gain power from
foreign intervetion. Rather, it was Noriega's ruthlessness, involvement
with drug trafficking, past relationships with the United States, and
perhaps his own popularity that accounted for his rise to power and
ability to maintain control. Nevertheless, it is not a major conceptual
leap to go from "counterintervention," for the purpose of reestablishing
democracy, to "humanitarian intervention," for the purpose of
establishing democracy, as it should not matter what the source of the
tyranny is.
The United States attempted to legitimize its humanitarian argument
by asserting that the U.N. Charter and other treaties state that
democracy, human rights, and self-determination are necessary
conditions for world peace, and that all member states have a duty to
abide by these values and to work with the United Nations in protecting
and establishing them globally."' 5 The United States further asserted
160. Reisman, supra note 151; see also Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic
Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984) [hereinafter Pro-Democratic Invasion].
161. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick & Allan Gerson, The Reagan Doctrine, Human Rights, and




165. David J. Scheffer, Introduction: The Great Debate of the 1980's in RIGHT V. MIGHT, 1,
9-10 (Council on Foreign Relations ed., 2d ed. 1991). The U.S. humanitarian defense can be
articulated as follows:
American leaders did not abandon the conviction that legitimate government is based
on respect for individual rights and the consent of the governed or the belief that all
people deserve such government.
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that because the Security Council had miserably failed to do this, it is
incumbent upon members to fulfill their responsibilities individually."6
Under this view, the only limitations on U.S. intervention are political,
those concerning perception of national interest, available resources and
resolve. Accordingly, there is no just cause requirement of self-defense
or injury. In essence, just cause is anything the United States perceives
to be for the common good.
The U.S. defense is first based on the assumption that the United
Nations may intervene in states' affairs not only to prevent gross human
rights violations, but also to establish a particular political order. This
notion is contrary to article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter, which precludes
intervention in domestic matters. 67 Nevertheless, the international
community has circumvented the mandate of article 2(7) by reclassifying
what previously were considered domestic matters as international. In
this manner, the international community has empowered the United
Nations to become an instrument of world order, an entity no longer
limited to refereeing disputes between nation states, but rather tasked
with securing a particular political, social, economic and ideological
order within and among the states.
The U.N.'s new role has been attributed to the international
community's periodic shift of basic values." This shift in values
permits a reinterpretation of the U.N. Charter, regardless of its language,
in order to accommodate changing political objectives. For example,
originally, the highest value in the international hierarchy was peace. 69
The sovereignty of states was treated as sacred and unilateral force was
therefore limited to self-defense. Eventually, justice replaced peace as
the highest value.170 This change allowed nations to resort to self-help
The United Nations Charter is not neutral between these conceptions. It is
committed to democratic values and practices. Where one state uses armed force or
economic and military assistance to aid in the suppression of democratic values and
practices, other states are free to act to redress the balance and stop the forcible
repression of these values.
Id.
166. Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 161, at 34.
167. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 7 states: "Nothing containedin the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of
any state ... ." Id.
168. Arend, supra note 151, at 2-3.
169. Id. at 5-6.
170. Id. at 10-18.
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measures including reprisals.' Supposedly, the world is now entering
a new age where democratic values have taken top priority."7
Consequently, the U.S. humanitarian intervention defense is further
based on the assertion that peace can only exist if all states embrace
democratic ideologies and therefore, military intervention used to
establish these values is lawful. Even assuming arguendo that military
intervention for democracy is lawful, the U.N. Charter clearly precludes
such intervention by individual states, preserving the right of intervention
for the Security Council. Accordingly, the U.S. humanitarian
intervention defense for its Panama invasion is deficient in all
aspects.173
171. Id.
172. Id. at 40-42.
173. Given the international reaction condemning the Panama invasion, one may conclude that
the world community does not prize democratic values so highly. Arend, supra note 151, at 44.
On the other hand, perhaps the U.N. General Assembly and O.A.S. are dominated by anti-
democratic elites from developing countries that don't reflect the true international consensus.
Kirkpatrick & Gerson, supra note 161, at 34. "The majority vote of member-states of the UN
General Assembly-which are predominantly nondemocratic-cannot deprive the United States or
other democratic nations of this right [of intervention]." Id. That is, the decision-making elites in
democratic nations are justified in establishing the form of government oppressed peoples
everywhere really want.
This policy-oriented approach to law is supported by other types of arguments. They usually
disparage "textualist" approaches to interpreting legal documents as too restrictive. Related to these
theories are general observations about how the world has changed. Somehow changes in the world
make the need for certain political and legal change self-evident. Criticizing the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, which establishes the canons for interpreting the text of treaties, author
Myres McDougal commented: "The great defect, and tragedy, in the International Law
Commission's final recommendations about the interpretation of treaties is in their insistent emphasis
upon an impossible, conformity-imposing textuality." Myres McDougal, The International Law
Commission's Draft Articles upon Interpretation: Textuality Redivius, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 992, 992
(1967).
The defense that Judge Abraham Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the Department of State during
Operation Just Cause, offered for U.S. actions also reflects this anti-textual, policy-oriented
approach. Sofaer calls it the "Common Lawyer" approach:
[Ulse of force rules should not be applied mechanically, as a "juristic push-button
device," but with an appreciation for all the relevant circumstances of each case. This
approach to international law looks not only to abstract propositions but to real-world
results and involves a continuing search for principles that most effectively advance
accepted international values.
Abraham Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, 29 CoLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 281, 283 (1991) [hereinafter The Legality of the United States Action in Panama]. The need to
rely on this totality of the circumstances approach is one of the strongest indicators that Noriega's
conduct was not an armed attack nor was one imminent. Apparently the language of legal
documents has little value. Legal "principles" are little more than arguments of expediency designed
to legitimize policy objectives.
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IV. Just Cause and the U.S. Constitution
The invasion of Panama was not lawful under the U.S. Constitution
because it was not authorized by Congress, who has the sole authority to
declare war. There has been almost no analysis of the legality of the
Panama invasion under U.S. domestic law. Americans were probably
as supportive of the action as foreign governments were opposed. Most
likely the invasion complied with the War Powers Resolution, 74 the
primary focus of debate over domestic law and use of force. Operation
Just Cause illustrates the fact that in some ways, the War Powers
Resolution pretends to give the President more power than the
Constitution gives him.
The central issue regarding the allocation of war powers is whether
Congress or the President has the Constitutional authority to commit the
nation to war. Article I of the Constitution states that Congress has the
power "[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water." 75  The
President serves as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States."176 These are the war powers clauses of greatest
immediate relevance.
A legal debate of mammoth proportions focuses upon the meaning
and application of these few words. Contemporary scholars frequently
ridicule legal analysis that focuses on the Constitutional text or that
attempts to clarify its meaning through studies designed to discern the
original intent. It is therefore interesting that in debating the allocation
of the war powers, scholars take a host of historical materials, including
18th century political philosophy, the proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention, and early state practice, quite seriously."7 These studies
have proven to be very valuable, though not decisive, on many issues.
One source that has not been especially emphasized is customary
international law. With its distinction between offensive and defensive
war, legal and prudential judgment, and acts of war and state of war, it
provides the analytical framework for understanding the allocation of war
powers.
174. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
175. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 11.
176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
177. E.g., WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND CONSTrrUTiONAL POWER, supra note 140; W.
TAYLOR REVELEY I, WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (1981); WORMUTH &
FIRMAGE, supra note 140.
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A. The Power to Declare War
Many positions have been argued which attempt to limit or abolish
the importance of Congressional declarations of war. The most
important positions are first, that declarations are relevant only to large
wars, and second, that due to state practice, declarations are not required
at all.
Although one of the marks of classic 17th and 18th century
international law treatises is that they took state practice very seriously,
they never viewed law simply as human convention. Indeed, classic
scholars recognized that the rules regarding declarations of war are
requirements of the law of nature. 17  As such, while customary law
may focus on state practice, it incorporates and is grounded in a
fundamental law that is not subject to alteration by state practice or
treaty. This general view was shared by the Founding Fathers and is
evidenced by their legal defense in the Declaration of Independence,
which appeals to the "laws of nature and of nature's God." 79
Classical scholars recognized that the rules regarding declarations of war
are requirements of the law of nature.1 "°
The importance of declarations of war has also been recognized by
the United States in this century. During the 18th and 19th centuries,
nations increasingly failed to comply with the declaration
requirement. 8 ' To remedy this situation, Hague Convention No. III
expressly incorporated the following customary norm: "The Contracting
178. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
179. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1-2 (U.S. 1776):
When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to
dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume,
among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature
and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires
that they should declare the causes Which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.
Id. The Declaration, which is in fact the founding constitutional document of the United States,
reflects the twofold nature of the decision to go to war set out in VATrEL, supra note 1, at 301. It
contains the legal bases, or just causes, for resort to war and the prudential concerns: "[pirudence,
indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient
causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while
evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
180. VATrEL, supra note 1, at 314-16; GROTIUS, supra note 99, at 634-35.
181. Clyde Eagleton, The Form and Function of the Declaration of War, 32 AM. J. INT'L L.
19, 20 (1938).
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Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence
without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned
declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of
war. " 182
Some scholars have argued that only large wars require declarations
of war.8 3  However, the critical distinction in customary law is not
between large and small wars but between offensive and defensive
wars."I The essential components of declarations are (1) notice of
injuries and (2) demand for satisfaction." More formal requirements
are matters merely of state practice and, like other purely positive laws,
are amenable to change." Thus the power to "declare war" refers to
all offensive wars, both large and small."S
Early in the nation's history the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with the
power to declare war in the case of Bas v. Tingy. " In so doing,
Justice Washington distinguished perfect from imperfect war or state of
war from acts of hostility as follows:
[E]very contention by force between two nations, in external
matters, under the authority of their respective governments, is not
only war, but public war. If it be declared in form, it is called
solemn, and is of the perfect kind; because one whole nation is at war
with another whole nation; and all the members of the nation
declaring war, are authorized to commit hostilities against all the
members of the other, in every place, and under every circumstance.
182. Hague Convention No. III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, October 18, 1907, art.
1, 36 Stat. 2259; T.S. 538. Nazi Germany's violation of this provision formed a basis for the
charge of waging crimes against peace. See Trial of the Major War Criminals, 1 I.M.T. 1, 216-17
(1947) (Int'l Mil. Trib.). The United States is a party to the treaty.
183. E.g., Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 740, 74445 (1989).
184. See supra part III.A. 1.
185. See id.
186. VAT'EL, supra note 1, at 316:
It is necessary that the declaration of war be known to the state against whom it is
made. This is all which the natural law of nations requires. Nevertheless, if custom has
introduced certain formalities in the business, those nations who, by adopting the custom,
have given their tacit consent to such formalities, are under an obligation of observing
them .
Id.
187. The fact that Congress has the power to issue letters of marque and reprisal is further
evidence of Congress' sole authority to initiate war and acts of war. These letters authorized private
persons to seize or destroy enemy ships in particular as compensation or punishment for international
offenses. Charles A. Lofgren, War-Making Under the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
81 YALE L.J. 672, 679-80, 693-94 (1972).
188. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37 (1800).
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In such a war all the members act under a general authority, and all
the rights and consequences of war attach to their condition.
But hostilities may subsist between two nations more confined
in its nature and extent; being limited as to places, persons, and
things; and this is more properly termed imperfect war; because not
solemn, and because those who are authorized to commit hostilities,
act under special authority, and can go no farther than to the extent
of their commission ...
But, secondly, it is said, that a war of the imperfect kind, is
more properly called acts of hostility, or reprizal, [sic] and that
Congress did not mean to consider the hostility subsisting between
France and the United States, as constituting a state of war.'8 9
The case of Bas v. Tingy arose from the Naval War of 1798 with
France.' 09  Congress authorized certain acts of war by statute. 91  A
statute may be different in form from a "solemn" declaration, yet it
fulfills all of the essential requirements of a declaration of war: It is a
public pronouncement putting the enemy on notice of wrongs done and
need for satisfaction. The critical distinctives of solemn declarations are
that they 'authorize far more extensive hostilities and that they
significantly alter legal relationships with foreign nationals and neutral
states.192 When Congress authorizes "acts of hostility, or reprisals," it
declares imperfect war. The extent of hostilities is limited in proportion
to the wrong done and as prudence would otherwise dictate."93
B. Presidential Powers
1. Historical View.-In Bas v. Tingy and other early cases, the
Supreme Court affirmed that Congress has the authority to initiate all
offensive wars."'4 However, it did not directly address the question of
whether Congress had the sole authority to initiate offensive war. In the
189. Id. at 40-41.
190. Id. at 37.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. As stated in Bas:
Congress is empowered to declare a general war, or Congress may wage a limited war;
limited in place, in objects, and in time. If a general war is declared, its extent and
operations are only restricted and regulated by thejus belli (lus in bello], forming a part
of the law of nations; but if a partial war is waged, its extent and operation depend on
our municipal laws.
Bas, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) at 43.
194. E.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Little v..Barreme, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 170, (1804); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
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absence of Congressional authorization, one must ask whether the
President has some inherent power to take offensive action.
The contention that the President has the inherent executive power
to initiate war does not appear to have been made in early cases or other
public forums. The "inherent Presidential powers" argument has a
particularly strong appeal if one believes that declarations of war, as used
in the Constitution, refer only to "solemn" declarations required to
initiate perfect wars."9 However, there are several reasons, in addition
to those given above, to reject the interpretation that the President has
any inherent power to initiate offensive war.
First, one of the primary goals at the Philadelphia Convention of
1787 was to create a government that could deal effectively with other
nations.'96 The Framers recognized the need for an effective executive
branch, but they wished to avoid the dangers endemic to monarchical
governments in which the war powers usually resided in one person."
An original draft of the Constitution gave Congress the power to "make
war." 98  One delegate suggested that instead of Congress, the
President should have the power to make war.' The proposal had so
little support that the delegate did not make a formal motion.' The
delegates even rejected a proposal to place the power in the Senate.
Several delegates believed the word "make" war was problematic."'
Such discussion would suggest that Congress had the power to actually
conduct war and that the President would have no authority to respond
to sudden attacks. To fix this ambiguity, James Madison moved to
"insert 'declare' striking out 'make' war, leaving to the Executive the
power to repel sudden attacks. "' It is unclear why the language,
"power to repel sudden attacks," did not make it into the text. 3 The
Framer's probably thought the power to wage defensive war was inherent
in the Commander in Chief.3
195. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.





201. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318-19 (Max Farrand ed., 1937).
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 provides that "[n]o state shall, without the consent of
Congress ... engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit
of delay." Id. The President's inherent power would be similar to the inherent power residing in
the states.
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However, the Framers were especially anxious to avoid a
framework like England's, where the King had all the power over
foreign affairs, including both the power to initiate and conduct wars.
As a result, England experienced wars based on slight cause or wars
done in the name of conquest. These wars were often financed by debt
and waged at great cost in national blood and treasure. 2°5
Consequently, recognizing the importance of speed, secrecy and unity of
action in conducting war, the Framers entrusted the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, with the power to conduct war.2°6 However, to
place restraints on the decision to initiate war, the Framers gave
Congress the power to declare war. It was not until the 20th century that
the exclusive authority of Congress to initiate war was seriously
challenged.
2. Modern View.-In this century, presidents and members of
Congress have continued to assert that the President has the inherent
authority to initiate war.' Some of these claims are arguably based
on constitutional principles, while others are grounded simply in
expediency. A principled argument is that Article II of the Constitution
vests all executive powers in the President except for those explicitly
given to Congress. 208 Because the powers to both initiate and to
conduct war are executive in nature, Congress' power over such
inherently executive matters must be narrowly interpreted.'
Other claims advocating that the President has the power to initiate
war are based simply on expediency. They usually appeal to the
argument that rapidly changing world conditions and the nature of war
205. 2 ABRAHAM LINCOLN, THE WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 51-52 (A. Lapsley ed.,
1906):
The provision of the Constitution giving the war-making power to Congress was
dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: Kings had always been involving
and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good
of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive
of all kingly oppression, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man
should hold the power of bringing oppression on us.
Id. at 52.
206. WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER, supra note 140, at 48-49.
207. REPORT OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITIEE ON THE WAR POWERS ACT, S. REP.
NO. 220, 93rd Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
208. U.S. CONST. art. II (pertaining to the executive power of the President).
209. ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEAUNG THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION 56-58 (1991). This
assertion is often accompanied by reference to John Locke's Concerning Civil Government 1143-
148 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., 1952) (1690). Locke calls the power to deal with external
matters the "federative powers" and includes in them the "power of war and peace." LOCKE, supra,
1146. He notes that the federative power is usually placed in the executive and that as a matter of
prudence it should be. Id. 147.
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require the speed in decision making and unity of foreign policy that only
the President can provide.210 These claims are accompanied by an
interpretation of the Constitution that allows it to meet any "demand" of
expediency.21'
Proponents of the view that the war powers are inherently executive
draw different conclusions as to the respective roles of Congress and the
President. One view is that Congress has the power to initiate only
perfect wars because the words "declare war" refer only to "solemn"
ones. 212  The President would have the sole authority to initiate all
other wars.213 A second view is that the Constitution vests concurrent
214authority in Congress and the President to initiate imperfect wars.
This position seems harder to justify by the text. A third position is that
the Constitution actually does give Congress the sole authority to initiate
210. E.g., W. Michael Reisman, War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence, in
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 68 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) [hereinafter
War Powers: The Operational Code of Competence].
211. The adaptivist approach relies upon custom to determine the Constitution's
meaning. It addresses the deficiencies of the first two [reliance upon the text
and original intent] methodologies by downplaying the primacy of the
Constitution as originally conceived; the approach relies instead upon
subsequent practice .... Dean Sandalow has written that constitutional law
is not an exegesis, but a process by which each generation gives formal
expression to the values it holds fundamental in the operations ofgovernment.
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONsTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 46 (1990).
212. Eugene V. Rostow, President, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J. INT'L
L. 740 (1989).
[Tihe exclusive power to declare war conferred on Congress in Article I, section 8 gives
Congress the sole authority to use or threaten to use the national force, save perhaps in
the case of sudden attacks.
This common view rests on two simple errors. Under international law, to which
the relevant paragraphs of Article I refer, declarations of war are required only for the
rare occasions when states engage in unlimited general war .... And Hamilton argued
that Congress's power to declare war, being an exception to the general powers of the
Executive according to the model of the Founding Fathers knew best, that of the British
Crown, should be confined to the terms of the text.
Id. at 744-45.
213. Id.
214. J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27 (1991).
The historical practice-that Congress has rarely declared war despite numerous
deployments of force-is made more explicable as a matter of constitutional law if one
reads Bas as a case about sovereignty rather than the separation of powers. . . . So
viewed, Bas merely acknowledged that there exists a lacuna of undeclared war, which
might be "authorized" by Congress, but which might also be directly waged by the
President as Commander in Chief without prior congressional authorization (in which
case Congress's "authorization" of such warfare, either prospective or retroactive, would
be no more than hortatory).
Id. at 60-61.
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all offensive wars.2"5 However, this delegation of power to Congress
is to be interpreted very narrowly. More important, this interpretation
argues that Congress may not intermeddle with Presidential decisions to
deploy troops during time of war or peace.2"6 If this view is correct,
then the power of Congress to initiate war is greatly undermined. The
President can simply deploy forces to places they will likely be attacked,
in which case they may act in self-defense.
3. U.S. Involvement with the U.N.-The United States attempted to
alienate any unilateral right to wage offensive war when it joined the
United Nations. Consequently, many believe that the Constitutional issue
of who has the authority to declare war has become moot.2 7  To the
contrary, this fact has not made the issue moot, it has only made it more
complicated. It simply assumes that the President and Senate may
delegate a power which constitutionally belongs to Congress.
Article 43 of the U.N. Charter requires member states to make
armed forces available to the Security Council for enforcement
actions."' These forces are supposed to be on call as provided in
special agreements made between member states and the United
Nations.219  Congress passed the U.N. Participation Act of 1945, 2
215. Id.
216. The War Powers After 200 Years: Congress and the President at a Constitutional Impasse,
Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on War Powers of the Conmittee on Foreign Relations, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. 778 (1988) (testimony of Robert F. Turner, Associate Director, Center for Law
and National Security) [hereinafter War Powers After 200 Years].
If the President decides that the national interests require commencing a "war" against
another State, he must obtain the approval of both the House and the Senate in advance
of initiating such a conflict. Like other exceptions to the President's "Executive"
powers, the power "to declare war" was intended to be construed narrowly. It gives
Congress a "veto" over a presidential decision to launch an offensive "war," but it does
not empower you to seize control of the President's independent constitutional powers on
the theory that the President's management of military deployments might lead another
State to commit aggression against the United States.
Id. at 851. However, it is unclear what "offensive war" means to Mr. Turner. It would seem to
have included something less than "perfect" war but more than "hostilities." Id. at 856.
217. The fact that the importance of the congressional power "to declare war" has
been reduced by the prohibition in the U.N. Charter of the types of war with
which such declarations have historically been associated should not be viewed
by you with dismay but with joy. You have "lost" nothing to the
President-you have both gained by developments of law which seek to
provide a more peaceful world.
War Powers After 200 Years, supra note 216, at 851.
218. U.N CHARTER art. 43, 1 states: "All members... undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed
forces, assistance, and facilities . . " Id.
219. Id.
220. 22 U.S.C. §§ 287-287e (1988).
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which authorizes the President to enter into Article 43 agreements.
However, Congress must specifically approve any agreement that is
negotiated."' Once Congress approves an agreement, the President
may assign American forces to participate in U.N. actions without any
further authorization of Congress.'m The Act places no limits on size
of forces to be made available. 2' However, Congress could set limits
when it approves an Article 43 agreement.' 2
Congress enacted the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 with the
understanding that U.S. forces would thereby be used only in "police
actions" and not "war."' Of course, there is no constitutional basis
for distinguishing between police actions and war. The understanding
was that U.S. participation in U.N.-authorized actions amounting to war
would require separate and specific authorization of Congress.' In
essence, this authorization was to be a declaration of war. At present,
the United States has never entered into an Article 43 agreement. 7
In 1945, neither Congress nor the President suggested that the President
has inherent authority to make an Article 43 agreement, to commit U.S.
forces to offensive action simply on Security Council authorization,'
or to commit U.S. forces to offensive actions simply on his owninitiative. '
This understanding of article 43 changed dramatically with the
Korean War, when President Truman committed American forces to war
on U.N. authorization but without a Congressional declaration." A
State Department memorandum claimed that as Commander in Chief the
President had full control over U.S. forces and could employ them
without Congressional approval to protect "the broad interests of
American foreign policy.""' This memo was either an assertion of
very broad inherent executive powers or a very expansive redefinition of
self-defense. In either case, it asserted the right of the President acting




225. Jane E. Stromseth, Rethinking War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United
Nations, 81 GEo. L.J. 597, 604 (1993).
226. Id. at 620.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 604, 614-15.
229. Id.
230. Stromseth, supra note 225, at 621. There is evidence he would have acted even without
U.N. authorization. Id.
231. Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1950, at
173, 174.
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alone to go beyond the just causes of customary law and to employ
forces simply because he believes it is in the national interest.
President Bush presented similar views of executive power for
commitment of U.S. forces to Desert Storm. 2  He stated afterwards
that he "didn't have to get permission from some old goat in the United
States Congress to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait."233 It further
appears that he believed he possessed this power independently of the
U.N. authorization which he courted so carefully while virtually ignoring
Congress. If he viewed the action in Kuwait as offensive he had an
incredibly strong view of inherent executive power. On the other hand,
he may. have believed that Desert Storm was a defensive action even
from the United States' perspective, and therefore, required no
Congressional approval. This would entail, however, an extremely
expansive view of self-defense, making it little more than a promotion
of national interest.
There are several theories that espouse the theme that the President
alone, or the President along with the United Nations, does not need
Congressional authorization to wage war. One theory states that all
U.N. actions are police actions regardless of size.' Since they are not
wars, U.S. participation requires no Congressional approval." A
similar theory argues that the Constitution does not require Congressional
approval for Article 43 agreements once the United States became a
member of the United Nations. The President then has the duty to
execute the law of the land which includes treaty obligations. 6  Of
course, this argument also improperly assumes that nothing in the
232. President George Bush, Remarks to Texas State Republican Convention in Dallas, Texas,
28 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1119 (June 20, 1992).
233. Id. at 1120-21.
234. Thomas M. Frank & Faiza Patel, Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign
Relations Law, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 64 (1991). "As a textual matter, it is obvious on its face
that the Charter, in creating the new police power, intended to establish an exclusive alternative to
the old war system." Id. at 64. As such, the authors imply that the U.S. Constitution may be
amended by treaty stating that "[t]he hawks and doves, instead of welcoming a new era too long
aborning, cling to a theory of constitutionalism that was specifically rebuffed by the Senate when
ratifying the Charter and legislating the implementation of the new UN police power." Id. at 64-65.
235. Id.
236. GLENNON, supra note 211, at 202.
On the other hand, presidents have argued on occasion that a treaty conferred
discretionary authority to introduce the armed forces into hostilities to enforce the terms
of that treaty ....
Although not always articulated this way, the claim might have been that the
Constitution required that the President "take care that the laws be faithfully executed"
and that treaties constitute law for purposes of the faithful-execution clause.
Id.
13 DICK. J. INT'L LAW FALL 1994
Constitution forbids altering or delegating the allocation of war powers
by statute or treaty.231 A third theory is that all U.N. actions are in
effect defensive since they serve the end of defending world peace or
since an attack on anyone is considered an attack on all.s
Presumably, the President may commit forces without Congressional
consent because the power to act bn his own initiative in defensive wars
has always been recognized.
A myriad of theories allow the President to act without
Congressional approval or consent. All of these arguments are
disingenuous attempts to alter the Constitution to fit contemporary
"needs." Indeed, there is one common ploy used by the sophisticated
and the simple to demonstrate that declarations of war are not required
and that the President may therefore initiate war. This ploy is instituted
as follows:
The question is asked: How many wars has the U.S. been involved
in? The answer varies, but sometimes runs in excess of two
hundred. The next question is asked: How many of these were
delcared wars? The answer given is five.
The simple end the discussion, having proven their point. The
sophisticated proceed-to talk about law-creating custom in which state
practice gives new meaning to the living Constitution 9 or to argue
that this is proof that the Constitution does not require declarations for
237. The issue of the constitutionality of delegating government powers is similar to that found
in domestic administrative law. In administrative law, the nondelegation doctrine is so eroded that
little of it is left. There is greater judicial authority for delegating Congressional powers relating
to foreign matters than even domestic ones. See, e.g. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). On the other hand,
there are several factors that may make the delegation of the war powers more restrictive. They ate
not legislative in nature and the Constitution gives them specifically to Congress. Because the
Constitution doesn't specifically forbid their delegation, the test in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957) and Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) would not seem to preclude delegation by
treaty. Once a textual approach to the Constitution is abandoned there is absolutely no limit on
delegation except political expediency.
238. Stromseth, supra note 225, at 613. A similar reasoning may apply to other collective
security arrangements. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 821 (John Norton Moore, et al. eds. 1990).
If the "constitutional processes" of the United States do not require a legislative
authorization before the President can authorize hostilities in the face of an armed attack
against the United States, and the treaty as a matter of law transforms an attack against
a NATO ally into an attack against the United States, one could argue that the treaty is
self-executing in that no additional legislative approval is needed.
Id.
239. GLENNON, supra note 211, at 40-42.
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Iall offensive war in the first place.' Either way this approach
involves a gross distortion of facts.
Many U.S. wars have gone undeclared for good reason. Most of
them have been defensive. Therefore, no declaration has been required.
Furthermore, as discussed above, "solemn" declarations are required
only to initiate perfect wars." All offensive wars require some
declaration of war, but because they can only punish or exact
compensation in proportion to the injury, most are limited or
imperfect. 22 Therefore, Congress can authorize offensive actions with
means other than "solemn" declarations.243 Congress has done this on
several occasions.'
C. The True Nature of the War Powers
The argument that the war powers are inherently executive in nature
is fundamentally flawed. The decision to go to war involves both a legal
and a prudential judgment.245 The primary judgment is legal in nature.
It is the determination that there is or is not just cause.' This does
not suggest that the decision to use force is to be determined by the
courts. Rather it is a question of methodology that can be demonstrated
by considering the two common ways in which people use the word
"judgment." A legal judgment is backward-looking. It determines what
happened, or who did it, and whether a standard of conduct has been
violated. If the law was broken, a judge awards punishment or
compensation to satisfy the demands of justice.
Once a nation has made a legal judgment that there is just cause, it
must still exercise "good judgment" in deciding how best to remedy
those wrongs. This kind of judgment is prudential in nature, which is
forward-looking.247 In making prudential judgments, persons apply
what they have learned in the past and what they know about their
current circumstance. They use this knowledge not to judge whether
someone has committed an offense, but rather to achieve a particular
240. Eugene V. Rostow, "Once More unto the Breach:' The War Powers Resolution Revisited,
21 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1986) [hereinafter Once More unto the Breach].
241. See supra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. War Powers Resolution: Hearings Before the Senate Conmittee on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., I st Sess. 84 (1977) (testimony of Mr. Abraham Sofaer) [hereinafter War Powers Resolution].
245. See supra part IIl.A.2.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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objective. The person who acts most appropriately and effectively in
making decisions is said to exercise good judgment.
Legal judgments are the centerpiece of the customary law concept
of jus ad bellum. The whole purpose of jus ad bellum is that war is
governed by law and that a nation must judge that it has just cause before
resorting to arms.2u However, once there is a legal judgment, a
nation must make two distinct but closely related types of prudential
judgments. Both types of prudential judgment are extremely important
and often become the center of attention. The first is whether military
force should be used at all. 9 Military force may not be the wisest
course of action even when all peaceful means have been exhausted. The
wrong may be too slight or the offender too powerful to make an appeal
to arms prudent. The second type of prudential judgment that must be
made is how best to prosecute a war effort.' Both of these decisions
are designed to most effectively accomplish the mission at the least cost
in lives and resources.
Indeed, one of the most familiar legal maxims is that no one should
be the judge of his own case."5 However, where there is no superior
neutral judicial tribunal to which nations may take their cases, they must
be their own judges. 2  The Framers of the U.S. Constitution
obviously believed that Congress, a large and deliberative body, was
more likely than a single executive to render impartial decisions.
Additionally, if the nation was to commit its blood and treasure to war,
the people's representatives were seen to be most fit to make that choice.
James Madison noted that "the power to declare war, including the
power of judging the causes of war, is fully and exclusively in the
legislature." 3  Once the nation is committed to war, however, the
Constitution entrusts the prudential decisions involved in prosecuting the
war effort to the President.'
The foreign policy powers, in particular the power to make war,
bear some resemblance to the executive powers."*  John Locke
248. See supra part III.
249. See supra part III.A.2.
250. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
251. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
252. Id.
253. 3 MICHAEL J. GLENNON & THOMAS M. FRANCK, UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW 69, 79 (1981).
254. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
255. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. I, (Philadelphia, June 29, 1793), in 15 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 39 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969):
The general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of
the Nation is vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qu[a]lifications
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observed that they are "much less capable to be directed by antecedent,
standing, positive laws" than even the executive power.,56  Locke
further noted that the executive and federative powers are distinct,
though usually invested in the same person. Nevertheless, while in
practice the chief executive of most states normally possessed federative
powers, such powers are not inherently executive in nature. 257  Only
if one takes a purely functionalist approach in determining the nature of
governmental powers may the federative powers be viewed as
executive.5 8 However, from a functionalist perspective it is improper
to speak of anything as having an inherent nature 59 Madison, on the
other hand, argued that the power to make war was legislative in nature
because it bore similarities to law-making. 2  Specifically, he
contended that declarations of war significantly alter the legal relations,
rights, and responsibilities of individuals and nations.
Federative powers are distinct from legislative and executive powers
for a number of reasons. Locke wrote that nation states are in a state of
nature with one another, meaning there is no superior civil authority."
which are expressed in the instrument.
Two of these have been already noticed-the participation of the Senate in the
appointment of Officers and the making of Treaties. A third remains to be mentioned
the right of the Legislature "to declare war and grant letters of marque and reprisal."
Id.
256. LOCKE, supra note 209, 147.
257. Id.
258. Basically, for the functionalist, a thing is-whatever it does. If the executive branch, be it
King or President, commences wars then war-making must be an executive function because that is
something the executive does.
In other words, instead of assuming hidden causes or transcendental principles
behind everything we see or do, we are to redefine the concepts of abstract thought as
constructs, or functions, or complexes, or patterns, or arrangements, of the things that
we do actually see or do. All concepts that cannot be defined in terms of the elements
of actual experience are meaningless.
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809,
826 (1935).
259. James Madison, Helvidius, No. I, (1793), reprinted in I LETrERS AND OTHER WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON, 615 (J.B. Lippincott & Co. ed. 1865):
All his [the President's] acts, therefore, properly executive, must presuppose the
existence of the laws to be executed....
A declaration that there shall be war is not an execution of laws; it does not
suppose pre-existing laws to be executed; it is not, in any respect, an act merely
executive. It is, on the contrary, one of the most deliberative acts that can be performed,
and, when performed, has the effect of repealing all the laws operating in a state of
peace, so far as they are inconsistent with a state of war, and of enacting as a rule for the
executive, a new code adapted to the relation between the society and its foreign enemy.
Id.
260. Id.
261. LOCKE, supra note 209, 145.
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For the legal positivist, who believes that law is nothing more than the
commands of a political sovereign, the fact that nations are in a "state of
nature" makes law impossible.
Since the 19th century, international lawyers have tried to convince
themselves and others that there really is such a thing as international
law. 2  International law arises not from legislation but agreement
among nations. This basic reality of independent nations is what makes
it improper to speak of the federative powers as legislative or executive
in nature. Congress does not enact laws regulating conduct between
nations. The President does not act as a superior civil magistrate
executing the law of Congress, but as one among equals appealing to a
law that binds all nations.
If this analysis is correct, the Constitution's delegation of all
executive powers to the President has little relevance for allocation of
war powers. Therefore, any express grants of the federative powers,
whether to the President or to Congress, should be interpreted no more
narrowly or generously than any other specific grant of power. All of
the federative powers, namely foreign affairs powers, belong to the
government of the United States and are therefore federal powers."
262. International lawyershave questioned the existence of international law since the time of
JOHN AUSTIN'S THE PROVIDENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832). See e.g., LOUiS
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 10 (3d ed. 1993):
International law has had to justify its legitimacy and reality. Its title to law has
been challenged on the ground that by hypothesis and definition there can be no law
governing sovereign states. Skeptics have argued that there can be no international law
since there is no international legislature to make it, no international executive to enforce
it, and no effective international judiciary to develop it or to resolve disputes about it.
International law has been said not to be "real law since it is commonly disregarded,
states obeying it only when they wish to, when it is in their interest to do so."
Id. International law, in large measure, is based on agreement, either express or implied, among
nations. If there is no superior political authority, what makes these agreements legally binding?
Hans Kelsen tried to answer this question when he wrote that it is binding "because a basic norm
is presupposed which establishes his custom among states as a law-creating fact." This he says is
"the 'constitution' of international law in a transcendental-logical sense." This forms the basis for
all other norms including the obligation to keep one's treaties. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF
LAW 216-17 (Max Knight trans., 1967). The classic commentaries believed that international law
is legally binding and truly law because there is a higher law of nature that makes agreements
binding and authorizes states to sanction breaches.
263. Hamilton, supra note 255, at 36. Hamilton notes further that, "[i]t will not be disputed
that the management of the affairs of this country with foreign nations is confided to the Government
of the United States." Id. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304. 318
(1936), the Supreme Court noted that:
It results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The powers
to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treatise, to maintain diplomatic
relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution,
would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.
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Any foreign affairs powers that the Constitution does not specifically
allocate, may be allocated by Congressionally-enacted law to the other
branches through the Constitution's necessary and proper clause.'"
The Constitution gives Congress the power to declare war. This
power entails the right to judge the causes of war, to judge the wisdom
of going to war, and to make domestic legal changes necessary for the
war effort. Congress may limit the nature, extent, and objectives of
hostilities to ensure proportionality of reprisals and to check against
dangerous expansion of the hostilities. The President, as Commander in
Chief, has the power to conduct the war effort and defend against attack.
A more difficult question arises in regard to control of the
President's decisions as Commander in Chief.' Since that office is
specifically delegated to the President, the powers entailed must have
some content that Congress cannot interfere with. Tactical and
operational decisions it would seem are relatively free from direct
Congressional control. However, Congress has considerable influence
over even these matters through the powers of the purse, raising armies,
maintaining a Navy, and making rules to govern the armed forces.'
Another difficult question concerns the deployment of forces in
peacetime. If the President deploys troops in places they are sure to be
attacked, he would nullify the war powers of Congress. A great deal of
Id. Curtiss-Wright is cited only for the proposition that the power over foreign affairs resides in the
federal government. Some implications of the decision regarding the source of the powers and their
residence in the executive branch are erroneous. See David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations
Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A.
Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE
L.J. 1 (1973).
264.. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. This use of the necessary and proper clause was discussed
in the War Powers Act's legislative history. As noted by the debates:
It is also of great importance to note that the residual legislative authority over the
entire domain of foreign policy-not just the war power-was placed in Congress by the
Constitution. Members of Congress have themselves perhaps underestimated the
authority vested in them by the "necessary and proper" clause .... That clause entrusts
the Congress to make all laws "necessary and proper for carrying into execution" not
only its own powers but "all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."
Report of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the War Powers Act, S. Rep. 220, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973).
265. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton). "The President is to be
commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States .... It would amount to nothing
more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces, as first general and
admiral of the Confederacy . . . ." Id.
266. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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the controversy over the War Powers Resolution focuses on this
issue. 26"
If the conclusion reached in Part III is correct, namely that the
Panama invasion was an offensive act of war, and the conclusion of this
Part is correct, that only Congress has the power to authorize offensive
war, then Operation Just Cause violated the U.S. Constitution. The
United States violated customary and treaty law by proceeding without
a declaration of war. It violated the U.N. Charter for going to war at
all.
Surprisingly however, the President could argue quite persuasively
that he complied with the War Powers Resolution even though he
certainly would not admit being bound by it. Section 1541(c) of the
Resolution states that the President may introduce forces into hostilities
"only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory
authorization; or (3) a national emergency created by an attack upon the
United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces."269
This section appears to be a simple restatement of the war powers as
allocated in the Constitution. Moreover, this section appears to be based
upon the customary law distinction between offensive and defensive war.
However, sections 1543 and 1544 attempt to give the President greater
power than the Constitution permits by allowing the President to
introduce forces anywhere for up to 90 days without Congressional
authorization.27 Operation Just Cause complied with this portion of
the War Powers Resolution. Accordingly, while most debate over the
Resolution has focused on the question of whether the War Powers
Resolution unconstitutionally limits the President's power, the Panama
invasion illustrates the fact that the War Powers Resolution attempts to
delegate Congressional powers to the President."
D. Changing World or Changing Mission?
The "world is changing" approach to reinterpreting the Constitution
is at the heart of the war powers debate.m It provides the basis for
the view that inherent executive powers allow the President to initiate
267. 1 TURNER, supra note 209, at 80-85. Mr. Turner argues for broad powers. The analysis
of authors WORMUTH AND FIRMAGE, supra note 140, finding limited inherent authority is more
convincing.
268. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
269. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c) (1988).
270. Id. §§ 1543, 1544.
271. THOMAS F. EAGLETON, WAR AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: A CHRONICLE OF
CONGRESSIONAL SURRENDER 203-05 (1973).
272. See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text.
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war and that the United States may delegate war-making powers to the
United Nations. Certainly the world and the nature of war in some
respects have changed, and certainly the Framers did not foresee the
development of an organization like the U.N. However, writers seldom
explain exactly how all of this requires a shift of war powers from
Congress to the President, except to say that it generates a shorter time
for responding to danger.'
All of this paints a picture of historical inevitability, but it belies the
true nature of the change. In a discussion of the War Powers Resolution
and the Constitution, one Presidential advisor, speaking with refreshing
candor have stated the following:
It is not so much that the world has changed in two hundred years as
that the United States and its role in the world have changed
substantially. The Constitution did not legislate a government
designed for maximum efficiency. It legislated a government
designed to protect the rights of the individual against an overbearing
government, and it does that very well. The problem is that the
inefficiency that kind of freedom-protecting innovation dictates makes
it very difficult for a world power to discharge its
responsibilities .274
This view of law makes it little more than an instrument of policy.
National policy has changed. Therefore, the Constitution must change.
Law takes whatever form is necessary or expedient to legitimize policy
decisions, and eventually law and politics become indistinguishable.
Nevertheless, this is hardly a rule of law. Ironically, the rule of law and
democratic processes of our Constitution are eliminated in order to make
the world safe for democracy and the rule of law.
V. Just Cause and Just War Doctrine
A. A Revival of Just War Doctrine
A revival of interest in just war doctrine is evident in contemporary
military education as well as in theological discourse. National leaders
have appealed to the just war doctrine in recent wars to justify their
decisions. American servicemen who must fight these wars and the
American public who must support them both recognize the fundamental
moral issues that are involved. Just war doctrine is not simply the
273. Resiman, supra note 151, at 70-71.
274. Symposium, War Powers and the Constitution, Am. Enterprise Inst. Pub. Pol'y Res., Dec.
6, 1983, at 4.
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reflection of a 2000-year-old Western moral tradition based on social
consensus. It reflects absolute and unchanging standards of right and
wrong that are revealed in conscience, nature, and Scripture.275
Policy-makers, lawyers, and operators who ignore this fundamental
reality do so at great risk to the nation's welfare. Customary
international law, as formulated in the 17th and 18th centuries,
incorporated the essential legal elements of the just war doctrine. 6
Additionally, the U.S. Constitution delegates the war powers in such a
way as to foster compliance with both the legal and prudential elements
of that doctrine.2
Classic just war doctrine developed over the course of a thousand
years, beginning with Augustine and culminating with the Spanish
theologian and lawyer, Victoria. Augustine addressed all of the basic
issues and set the framework for discussion that continues to this day.
Theologians, knights, canon lawyers, and civil lawyers worked within
that framework developing details and making applications.27
Occasionally, they made significant departures from it, most notably in
the practice of holy war.279 Regardless of the relative influence of the
various participants, the doctrine is uniquely a product of Christian
thought. Although contemporary writers parse out the particulars of the
doctrine in different ways, they are in essential agreement as to the basic
contents. An identification of the elements includes just cause, right
authority, right intention, proportionality of ends, last resort, reasonable
hope of success, and the aim of peace.'
It is important to remember that "just cause" is only one element of
a "just war." This fact highlights two different meanings of the word
"justice" as used in Christian theology.21 It also serves as a reminder
275. Yet, undoubtedly, the revealed law is of infinitely more authenticity than the moral system
that is framed by ethical writers and denominated natural law, because one is the law of nature
expressly declared so to be by God himself and the other is only what by the assistance of human
reason, we imagine to be that law. BLACKSTONE, supra note 60, at *42.
276. See supra part III.A.
277. See supra part IV.
278. FREDERICK H. RUSSELL, THE JUST WAR IN THE MIDDLE AGES (1975); JAMES TURNER
JOHNSON, IDEOLOGY, REASON, AND THE LIMITATION OF WAR: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR
CONCEPTS 1200-1740, 26-80 (1975).
279. See infra notes 295-307 and accompanying text.
280. James Turner Johnson, Just War Thinking and its Contemporary Application: The Moral
Significance of the Weinberger Doctrine, in THE RECOURSE TO WAR: AN APPRAISAL OF THE
WEINBERGER DOCTRINE 81 (Alan Ned Sabrosky & Robert L. Sloane eds., 1988) [hereinafter Just
War Thinking and its Conteporary Application]. These are the jus ad bellum elements of just war
doctrine. Johnson identifies two other elements relating to jus in bello: proportionality and
discrimination (noncombatant immunity).
281. 1 CHARLES HODGE, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 416 (1979).
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that just war doctrine is a composite of legal and prudential
elements.282 In Christian theology, upon which the just war doctrine
is based, justice is used in a broad sense to refer to the sum total of a
person's moral obligations.' Justice may also be used in a narrow
sense to refer to the judgment of a court.' Judges must decide cases
justly, but all men must also behave justly. To make just war, there
must be a legal judgment that there is just cause and a prudential
judgment that war will not be disproportionately costly. In Christian
theology, all judgments, be they legal or prudential, are moral in nature,
even though the judgments involve different methods of decision making.
Many question whether a doctrine that is fundamentally the product
of Western medieval Christianity can have contemporary relevance.
However, some scholars do believe that just war doctrine has a very
practical and significant relevance in formulating U.S. defense policy.
Those scholars propound that former Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger's criteria2 for the employment of U.S. combat forces
overseas are basically those of just war doctrine:
282. See supra part Inl.A.2. Several elements of just war doctrine entail legal judgments, while
some entail prudential judgments. Still others are a combination of legal and prudential.
283. The word justice, or righteousness, is used in Scripture sometimes in a
wider and sometimes in a more restricted sense. In theology, it is often
distinguished as justitia interna, or moral excellence, and justitia extema, or
rectitude of conduct....
• . . He [God] is a righteous ruler; all his laws are holy, just, and good. In his
moral government He faithfully adheres to those laws. He is impartial and uniform in
their execution.
HODGE, supra note 281, at 416.
284. As a judge he renders unto every man according to his works. He neither
condemns the innocent, nor clears the guilty; neither does He ever punish with
undue severity, Hence the justice of God is distinguished as rectoral, or that
which is concerned in the imposition of righteous laws and in their impartial
execution; and distributive, or that which is manifested in the righteous
distribution of rewards and punishment. The Bible constantly represents God
as a righteous ruler and a just judge.
HODGE, supra note 281, at 416. Hodge's use of the term "rectoral" corresponds with this article's
use of the term "prudential," and his term "distributive" to this article's use of the term "legal."
They are related but distinct terms.
Hodge further asserts that there are constant Biblical references to God as a just judge,
including the following: "He will judge the world in righteousness; he will govern the peoples with
justice." Psalm 9:8; "Endow the king with your justice, 0 God, the royal son with your
righteousness." Psalm 72:1.
285. Caspar Weinberger, The Uses of Military Power, Remarks to the National Press Club
(November 28, 1984) reprinted in CASPAR WEINBERGER, FIGHTING FOR PEACE: SEVEN CRITICAL
YEARS IN THE PENTAGON 433 (1990). The six criteria listed in his remarks have become known
as the Weinberger Doctrine.
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[T]he Weinberger Doctrine provides a clear and persuasive
contemporary example of just war thinking. I mean this claim in the
following senses: first, that the categories of thought employed...
in his "six conditions for committing United States military forces"
correspond directly with major categories that have coalesced in
historical just war tradition; and second, that the content . . . is
consistent with the content of just war tradition.28
Specifically, those believing that just war doctrine affects U.S.
defense policy claim that the Weinberger criteria correspond directly to
the just war criteria as follows:'
Just War Weinberger Doctrine
1. Just cause 1. Vital to national interests
2. Right authority 2. Support of American people and their
elected representatives
3. Proportionality of ends 3. Continual assessment of objectives and
forces committed
4. Reasonable hope of success 4. Clear intention of winning
5. Last resort 5. Last resort
6. Right intention 6. Clearly defined political and military
objectives
7. End of peace 7. (Implied in 1 and 5)
The parallel drawn between the just war and Weinberger doctrines
is extremely strained. While the two appear to be similar, there is a
fundamental dissimilarity between the two doctrines that looms far larger
than any similarities. The Weinberger Doctrine is a compendium of
286. Just War Thinking and its Contemporary Application, supra note 280, at 86. As stated by
Professor Johnson, the leading contemporary writer on just war:
mhe Weinberger Doctrine provides a clear and persuasive contemporary example of just
war thinking. I mean this claim in the following senses: first, that the categories of
thought employed.., in his 'six conditions for committing United States military forces'
correspond directly with major categories that have coalesced in historical just war
tradition; and second, that the content . . . is consistent with the content of just war
tradition.
Id.
287. Id. at 101. The order listed here is not Professor Johnson's nor former Secretary
Weinberger's. It is the order in which the criteria are discussed below. The just war criteria begin
with those that are primarily legal in nature and move on to those which are prudential.
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purely prudential considerations. At best, it is just war doctrine minus
just cause.
In fact, the Weinberger Doctrine is clearly missing several other
legal criteria than simply just cause. Additionally, the prudential criteria
of the Weinberger Doctrine are narrower than those of the just war
doctrine. Secretary Weinberger developed his standard in response to
fears of imprudent U.S. military involvement in Central America or
failed ventures like that in Beirut. 8 Weinberger's main purpose was
to limit the commitment of U.S. combat forces overseas and to assure
our military of full national commitment where it is employed.'
From the Department of Defense's perspective the criteria provide some
very important prudential guidelines for the use of force, and in that
sense they are limiting factors. 2" However, if the Weinberger
Doctrine was meant to be a comprehensive list of criteria for the national
decision to use force, it is severely wanting.
The elements of just war doctrine are described below. The
description will show that legal criteria are the heart of the doctrine.
This should not be viewed as a sacrifice of prudential concerns, such as,
national interests, to an unrealistic legality. Law, as properly conceived,
serves policy by being one of the surest guides to prudent decisions.
Operation Just Cause is considered in light of these just war criteria. A
comparative analysis of the Weinberger Doctrine then follows.
B. Just War Doctrine
1. Just Cause.-Augustine is considered the foremost expositor of
just war doctrine, even though he did not describe it systematically at
any one place in his writings. He wrote that wars which avenge injuries
are just.29' Later writers described with more specificity what it means
to avenge injuries. Gratian's Decretum, the first and perhaps greatest
systematic compilation and treatment of canon law, held that nations may
use force in self-defense, to exact compensation and to punish.2'
288. See Bernard Gwertzman, Shultz in Warning on Combat Troops for Latin Region Fears
Agonizing Choice: He Says Failure to Aid Rebels in Nicaragua Adds to Risk of U.S. Military Role,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1985, at Al; Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. To Rebuild Lebanon's Army; 40,000
Men is the Ultimate Goal, Dec. 3, 1982, at A12.
289. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 433.
290. Id.
291. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD bk. xix, ch. 7 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed. & Marcus
Dods trans., 1952) ("For it is the wrong-doing of the opposing party which compels the wise man
to wage just wars. . . ."). See also RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 18.
292. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 60-68. Thomas Aquinas quotes Augustine as authority for
defining just cause: "'A just war is usually described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation
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These same bases were accepted by the civil lawyers of Medieval
Europe.293 Sanctions were based on the existence of fault, and war
was seen as an extraordinary form of lawsuit to vindicate justice. The
underlying wrongs, and remedies available, were closely analogous to
those in a domestic legal system. Gratian's threefold purpose for the use
of force is also reflected in the international law treatises of Vattel and
Grotius. Likewise, the writings of the Roman philosopher Cicero assert
these three purposes, but Cicero's writings also differ from Christian just
war doctrine in other ways.'l
During the medieval period, attempts were made to expand the
bases of just cause. The most noteworthy was the development of the
concept of holy war.2' Holy war is supposedly justified on the sole
basis that others do not share the same religious beliefs.2' The goals
of conquest and conversion thus become lawful. 2' Religious
differences, even in the absence of other wrongs, are treated as just cause
for war.298 This theory was used in part to justify the Carolingian
conquest of Europe and the medieval Crusades in the Middle East.2'
However, Pope Innocent IV and the canon lawyer Hostiensis denied the
right to make war on Muslims or other pagans merely because they were
unbelievers.3"o This appears to have become the prevailing view in the
just war doctrine. Only the traditional just causes are a proper basis for
war. Crusades to recapture the Holy Land were justified not on the basis
or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs afflicted by its subjects, or
to restore what it has seized unjustly.'" THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II, ii,
question 40, art. I (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed. & Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., 1952).
293. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 137-38. In medievil times, civil authority's very existence
was to serve as God's agent of justice punishing criminals and exacting compensation for injuries.
Thus, canon lawyers, theologians, and civil lawyers all shared the same perspective, namely that
their authority was derived from God and the Bible. See, e.g., Romans 13:4 ("For he [the civil
ruler] is God's servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the
sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the
wrongdoer.").
.294. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 5-6.
295. Id. at 195-212; 251-57.
296. Id. at 195.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 195-212; 251-57.
300. Id. at 199. It was Innocent IV and his pupil Hostiensis who provided the conclusive
discussion of Christian claims to territories ruled by infidels. Innocent denied that Christians could
make war on Saracens merely because they were infidels and expressly prohibited wars of
conversion. Id.
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of religious differences, but by the fact it was territory that had been
stolen from Christiandom.30 '
Holy war doctrine in Christian theology seems to have been laid to
rest by Victoria. His treatise, De Indis et De Jure Belli Relectiones,
which is arguably the first modem treatise on international law, rejected
the justification of religious differences for war against the American
Indians." ° In fact, he argued for their right to fight against Christian
nations in self-defense. 30
3
Religious differences are the justification for Islamic Holy War or
Jihad. The purpose of Jihad is conquest and conversion. The conquered
who do not opt for conversion are usually accorded an inferior civil
status. 0
Holy war notions are not unique to religious thought. Cicero wrote
approvingly of wars waged to impose the ideals of Rome.30 5 In the last
two centuries, the counterpart to holy war has been war based on
ideology. A common theme in most of these wars is that conquest is for
the good of those who suffer under an inferior religious, social or
political order.
In the more recent Operation Just Cause, there was a just cause
basis for the invasion of Panama. There were numerous legal injuries
that provided just cause for war including harm done to American
citizens, breach of treaty rights, and failure to prosecute Noriega.3t 6
301. But when Saracens invaded Christian territories or attacked Christians, both
the Church and the Christian prince of the territory could wage a just war to
avenge their injuries and losses.... When Saracens occupied the Holy Land
the case was very different, for then either the Church or any Christian prince
could make war on them since Saracen possession of the Holy Land was an
offense to Christ and all Christians.
RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 199. Professor Johnson, leading scholar on the just war doctrine,
contends that holy war was much more a part of the "warp and woof" of medieval just war doctrine.
He also believes that it contributed to excesses in conducting war and to a retardation of development
ofjus in bello. See JOHNSON, supra note 278, at 1200-1740, 26-80.
Churchmen recognized that conversion is not effected through force of arms, but rather through
the preaching of the Gospel and work of the Holy Spirit in individuals. While the Bible uses martial
imagery, it makes a clear distinction between civil governments' "sword of steel" and the Church's
"sword of the Spirit." See, e.g., 2 Corinthians 10:3-5; Ephesians 6:17; Hebrews 4:12. Since at
least the 5th century, Christendom has drawn jurisdictional distinctions between Church and state
based on this "two swords" doctrine. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTIONS 92 (1983).
302. FRANCISCUS DE VIcrORIA, DE INDIS ET DE IURE BELLI REFLECTIONES 171 (John Pawley
Bate trans. 1917).
303. Id. at 129-49.
304. Joseph N. Kickasola, Kissing the Son: The Tragedy of the Conscience, the Crescent, and
the Cross, 136 Christian Statesman, July-Aug. 1993, at 3, 7-8.
305. BERNARD T. ADENEY, JUST WAR, POLITICAL REALISM, AND FAITH 24-27 (1988).
306. See supra parts II, III.C.
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Whether or not Operation Just Cause complied with the other elements
of just war doctrine is more problematic. Significantly, the Panama
Invasion was not a war waged in self-defense as the United States
claimed. Furthermore, Panama's lack of democracy was not a just cause
for waging war. It was, in effect, an ideological justification.
Ambassador Einaudi's statement defending Operation Just Cause before
the Organization of American States displays the fervor and rationale of
warfare motivated by religious ideology:
There are times in the life of men and of nations when history
seems to take charge of events and to sweep all obstacles from its
chosen path. At such moments, history appears to incarnate some
great and irresistible principle, such as the nation-state in the 17th
century, nationalism in the 19th century, and decolonization in the
middle part of this century.
Today, we are once again living in historic times, a time when
a great principle is spreading across the world like wild fire. That
principle, as we all know, is the revolutionary idea that the people,
not governments, are sovereign. This principle is the essence of the
democratic form of government. It is an idea which has, in this
decade, and especially in this historic year - 1989 - acquired the
force of historical necessity.'
The purpose of war limited to just cause is to return the wronged
party to the status quo ante bellum and not to use the war as an occasion
to establish some new social order. The notion that war may be waged
not simply to vindicate justice, but to establish a new social order, has
its analogue in domestic law. Theories of social justice in a domestic
system are designed to prevent all manner of injustice by remaking the
social order by means of force rather than persuasion. The false
assumption is that law and force can make people good or free or
responsible or whatever else they are lacking. The same rationale that
seems to justify the use of force for establishing democracy justifies
using force for establishing the whole panoply of human rights. If world
peace, and therefore national interest, depend on universal adherence to
democracy and practice of human rights, there are no legal limits left on
the decision to make war.
2. Right Authority.-There were several questions that medieval
Christianity had to resolve under the element of right authority.3 8 The
307. H.R. Doc. No. 127, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990) (statement of Luigi R. Einaudi, U.S.
Permanent Representative to the O.A.S.).
308. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 68-85, 100-05, 138-55; see also AUGUSTINE, supra note 291,
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first was whether or not, and under what conditions, private individuals
could resort to force.3" The second was what role the Church played
in authorizing force.310 The third question dealt with the allocation of
authority among civil rulers.3 ' The question was raised as to whether
the emperor was the only authority that could authorize war, or whether
lesser authorities could do so as well.312 Although the particular
answers given to these questions are not of immediate importance, they
do highlight two important issues. The first issue is whether or not the
decision-making authority is to be distributed among nation states. The
second issue addresses how this authority is to be distributed within a
particular state. The first issue has the strongest implications for
international law and the second for domestic law.
For example, if the invasion of Panama violated the U.N. Charter,
it would appear that the "right authority" principle of just war doctrine
was violated as well. Of course, this assumes that nations may delegate
the authority to wage offensive war to an international organization. It
is arguable that the attempted delegation of authority to the United
Nations is itself a violation of classic just war doctrine. Today,
international law is treated as nothing more than a system of positive law
based on treaty and custom. Under a positivist view nothing is
inherently required or forbidden by international law. The whole
attraction of just war doctrine, however, is that there are absolute
standards governing the conduct of nations that serve as a higher court
of appeal.
Medieval writers did not specifically address the question of whether
a nation may delegate to an international organization its sovereign right
to exact justice by engaging in offensive war. However, the issue is not
totally novel to the 20th century, either. The medieval writers had a host
of biblical and historical materials to draw upon if they had decided to
directly address the matter. For example, Augustine's The City of God
is replete with appeals to Scripture and history. In this work, Augustine
gives a theological explanation for man's sin and resulting wars. He
deals specifically with the biblical account of the Towel of Babel, in
which God created a multiplicity of nations and spread them over the
earth as a limitation on man's attempt to create a single political order
bk. I, ch. 21.
309. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 68-85.
310. Id. at 100-05.
311. Id. at 138-55.
312. Id.
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to replace the Kingdom of God.313 Augustine's view holds that a
multiplicity of nations with limited jurisdiction is a necessary limitation
on political, social and economic evil.314 Augustine's view is a direct
contradiction to the new-world-order assumptions embodied in the vision
of the United Nations. 35  The underlying premise of one-world
government schemes is that a multiplicity of nations is the cause of evil
rather than a limitation upon it.
The medieval writers further debated whether, among Christian
rulers, the Holy Roman Emperor alone had the authority to wage
offensive war.3"6 Eventually, a consensus arose that lesser officials did
have that right, but it remained difficult to determine at what level in the
civil hierarchy that right resided.31 In any event, the Emperor was
unable to monopolize force then, just as the Security Council is unable
to monopolize force today.
Most classic scholars based international law on the sovereignty of
nation states. That basis has been seriously questioned in this century.
Vattel also took a strong stand that international law included preexisting
and immutable laws of nature. Although he did not argue that the law
of nature required multiple nation-states, he certainly implied this in the
title of his treatise The Law of Nations; or, Principles of the Law of
Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and
Sovereigns.3 8 Moreover, he rejected the model which portrayed the
system of nation-states more like a universal republic." 9 Thus, under
a natural law framework, it is arguable that the delegation to the United
Nations of the right to use force is not only unworkable and imprudent,
it is unlawful as a violation of jus cogens.
313. AUGUSTINE, supra note 291, bk. XVI, ch. 4. See also Genesis 10; 11:1-9; Deuteronomy
32:8 ("When the Most High gave the nations their inheritance, when he divided all mankind, he set
up boundaries for the peoples according to the number of the sons of Israel."); Acts 17:26-27a
("From one man he made every nation of men, that they should inhabit the whole earth; and he
determined the times set for them and the exact places they should live. God did this so men would
seek him . . ").
314. AUGUSTINE, supra note 291, at bk. XVIII, ch. 34.
315. Augustine based his view on the Biblical passages from the prophet Daniel. Daniel 2:44
("In the time of those kings the God of heaven will set up a kingdom that will never be destroyed,
nor will it be left to another people. It will crush all those kingdoms and bring them to an end, but
it will itself endure forever."). From chapters 7-11 of Daniel, it becomes clear that the four
kingdoms mentioned in the second chapter of Daniel were Babylon, Medo-Persia, Greece, and
ancient Rome.
316. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 138-55.
317. Id.
318. VATrEL, supra note 1.
319. CHRISTIAN WOLFF, THE LAW OF NATIONS TREATED ACCORDING TO A SCIENTIFIC
METHOD 11-18 (Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934) (1749).
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Under our Constitution, only Congress may initiate war.312
Therefore, the Panama invasion violated the principle of right authority
by violating the domestic law set forth by the Constitution. Additionally,
the attempted delegation of war-making authority to the U.N. also
violates both the U.S. Constitution, and therefore, the principle of right
authority.
Although identification of right authority is a legal element of just
war doctrine, it is also procedural in nature. Thus, the right authority
identification differs from just cause determinations, which involve
substantive identifications. In contrast, in identifying whether there is
right authority, there is not only the legal inquiry as to whether the
proper authority made the just cause judgment, but also the prudential
judgments that are discussed below.
3. Proportionality of ends.-It is difficult to determine whether the
requirement that the ends of the war be proportionate to the means is a
legal requirement or a prudential one. It is probably both. In either
case, the requirement serves as a limiting factor on the use of force. If
a decision is made to use force, it must be proportionate to the wrong
done.32' Under the view that force is used to vindicate justice,
punishment should be based on just desert and compensation on injury
suffered. Proportionality is a necessary corollary of the just cause
element and is probably implied in it. These same principles are
applicable to sanctions in a civil court proceeding.
Proportionality is used in another sense. It is viewed as a prudential
consideration that focuses on the impact of war on a state's own citizens.
It asks whether the costs of exacting justice exceed the benefits to be
gained by waging war." 2 These considerations are similar to those
that law enforcement officials and prosecutors make in allocating
resources or that private citizens make in deciding whether to sue. The
cost in life and resources of prosecuting a war may be so great, or an
injury so small, that it is better to forego the wrong. It often is unjust,
320. See supra part IV.
321. See supra part III.
322. AUGUSTINE, supra note 291, bk III, ch. 1.
To begin with, the ends held out as the just cause must be sufficiently good and important
to warrant the extreme means of war, the arbitrament of arms. Beyond that, a projection
of the outcome of the war is required in which the probable good expected to result from
success is weighed against the probable evil that the war will cause.
O'BRIEN, supra note 59, at 272. There seems to have been little development or even recognition
of this issue through most of the medieval period. However, the Bible counsels kings to make sound
judgments concerning war. See, e.g., Luke 14:31; Proverbs 24:6.
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not to the wrongdoer, but to one's own citizens, to pursue the matter by
force.
Some writers confuse the meaning of proportionality. When
weighing the costs and benefits of going to war, it must be asked
whether the victim may weigh only its own relative costs and benefits,
or the costs to the offender must be included as well. Some writers
claim that the offender's costs must be calculated. 32 Surely this cannot
be right. Any time an offender is punished or forced to make restitution
he is worse off in a material sense. Consequently, it is impossible to see
how force could ever be proportionate if the offender's costs must be
weighed as well as the victim's.
The relative costs and benefits of going to war are anything but a
precise calculation. No one can determine with any certainty the loss of
lives and resources, the impact on families and domestic tranquility, or
the long-term effects on foreign relations. These factors all came into
play in Operation Just Cause. It is impossible to weigh the value of lives
lost, gains made on the war against drugs, or damage to relations in
Latin America. Probably most Americans would say that it was worth
the-cost. However, such a decision has been entrusted to Congress, and
Congress should have made the decision after weighing all of these
concerns. 324
4. Reasonable Hope of Success.-The element of reasonable hope
of success is clearly prudential in nature.3z In fact, it seems to be a
restatement of proportionality in the second or prudential sense as
outlined above.
5. Last Resort.-Last resort is primarily prudential and relates
closely to proportionality and reasonable hope of success. War is always
costly and full of uncertainty. Therefore, nations are morally bound to
pursue all peaceful means of settlement. This also insures fairness to the
other party. There is one legal component of this element: A
declaration of war. It is a requirement of both international and domestic
law. 326  Because declarations of war identify the just causes and are
323. O'BRIEN, supra note 59, at 28.
324. See supra part IV.
.325. See O'BRIEN, supra note 59, at 27, 28. AQUINAS, supra note 292, pt. I, ii, question 105,
art. III.
326. AQUINAS, supra note 292, pt. I, ii, question 105, art. III. Citing Deuteronomy 20:10,
Aquinas argued that declarations of war are a fundamental requirement of God's law binding all
nations. Id. In the medieval period the context of discussion of declarations of war focused more
on the issue of who had authority to initiate war. RUSSELL, supra note 278, at 62, 64, 89.
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issued by lawful authority, they relate to those elements as well.
Operation Just Cause was initiated without a declaration of war. The
United States claimed to have made exceptional unilateral and collective
diplomatic efforts through the O.A.S. to settle problems peacefully. One
glaring problem, however, was the refusal on the United States' behalf
to talk to Noriega prior to the invasion.
6. Right Intention.-Even if all the above criteria were met,
Augustine believed that one wages unjust war if he does so out of hatred
or other improper motives. 327 However, it is also important to check
ones motives because wrong motives often lead to a breach of the
external requirements. This element is also designed to guard against the
pretextual uses of force that appear to have played a part in Operation
Just Cause. 3:2
7. End of Peace.-The end of peace is another prudential concern.
Peace is the supreme purpose for which war is waged.3 29 By doing
justice, the magistrate sets conditions for peaceful relationships. It is one
of the measures of success and also an important component of intention;
therefore, it might be included under either of those elements. Peace is
not a mere cessation of fighting. Theologically speaking it is
reconciliation between enemies. While satisfaction of justice does not
necessarily work reconciliation, it is a necessary objective condition for
reconciliation.33 ° The U.N. Charter scheme which denies justice as the
cost of peace ends up forfeiting both justice and peace.
C. Weinberger Doctrine
The main difference between the just war doctrine and the
Weinberger Doctrine is that the later is a list of prudential criteria only.
In fact, the whole Weinberger list can probably be subsumed under the
327. AUGUSTINE, supra note 291, bk. III, ch. 14; AQUINAS, supra note 292, pt. II, ii, question
40, art. I. Aquinas wrote that there are three elements of just war: (1) lawful authority; (2) just
cause; and (3) right intention. The element of right intention entails several of the elements listed
in this article. Aquinas, quoting from Augustine, states, "[t]rue religion does not look upon as sinful
those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of
securing peace, of punishing evildoers, and of uplifting the good." Id. Properly waged a just war
is in the best interest of the offender as well. Id.
328. John Quigley, The Legality of the United States Invasion of Panama, 15 YALE J. INT'L L.
276, 310-14 (1990) (suggesting that the impetus for the Panama Invasion were actually goals less
admirable than those publicly asserted).
329. AUGUSTINE, supra note 291, bk. XIX, chs. 11-14.
330. Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Christ's Atonement as the Model for Civil Justice, 38 AM. J. JURIS.
189 (1993).
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element of "national interest." All of the other elements are particular
considerations that guide decision makers in promoting the national
interest.
1. Vital to our national interest.33 '-One scholar correctly notes
that, "Weinberger's conception of just cause is far more elastic than the
international law conception, and at first look it is also more elastic than
allowed in classic just war theory."33 2  The Weinberger Doctrine is
"far more elastic" than international law because it does not limit
unilateral force to self-defense. In addition, it requires no just. cause
whatsoever. The only way it can be made consistent with classic just
war theory is to read something into it that Secretary Weinberger did not
even suggest in his remarks. If he intended the Doctrine to be the sum
total of criteria for the use of force, the lack of legal criteria was a
serious omission. On the other hand, if the Doctrine was intended to list
the prudential considerations for the use of force once the legal elements
were satisfied, it is of course less problematic, but it is certainly not a
restatement of just war doctrine. There is every reason to believe,
however, that it is nearly his sum total of criteria for the use of force.
Actually, it seems to be a rejection of the just war doctrine.
At the beginning of his remarks, former Secretary Weinberger cast
the context for his criteria in the broadest terms. He asked: "Under
what circumstances, and by what means, does a great democracy such
as ours reach the painful decision that the use of military force is
necessary to protect our interests or to carry out our national
policy?"3 33 The way in which he painted the world scene and the state
of international law indicates that jus ad bellum has little relevance in
most situations involving the use of force:
While the use of military force to defend territory has never been
questioned when a democracy has been attacked and its very survival
threatened, most democracies have rejected the unilateral aggressive
use of force to invade, conquer or subjugate other nations. The
extent to which the use of force is acceptable remains unresolved for
331. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 441.
[The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the
particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our
allies. That emphatically does not mean that we should declare beforehand, as we did
with Korea in 1950, that a particular area is outside our strategic perimeter.
Id.
332. Just War Thinking and its Contemporary Application, supra note 280, at 104.
333. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 434.
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the host of other situations which fall between these extremes of
defensive and aggressive use of force.
We find ourselves, then, face to face with a modem paradox: The
most likely challenge to the peace-the gray area conflicts-are precisely
the most difficult challenges to which a democracy must respond. 3'
Secretary Weinberger cast U.S. interests as universal in scope, yet
he realized that the United States could not respond to all of these
interests with force. The only limits he saw, however, were prudential,
the single most important one being that the United States has "a strong
consensus of support and agreement for our basic purposes.""33
Weinberger's approach is very much like that of 19th century
German military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, whose writings on war
are still in vogue today. As noted by Clausewitz:
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true
political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on
with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the
peculiar nature of its means.31
Under modem theory, war is simply a prudential or political instrument
whose distinguishing trait is violence. Such a theory purports that war
is used first and foremost to serve the national interest, regardless of how
that political interest is defined.
This view compliments the "national interest" approach to decision
making. Under this view, one may ask only whether it is in the national
interest to have a canal connecting two oceans, lower prices on oil, or
political stability on another continent. If the answer is yes, and the
objectives can't be achieved by peaceful political intercourse, then the
use of force is legitimized. This view does not ask whether a legal
wrong has been committed against the United States. The only limitation
on an action is whether the political costs outweigh the expected benefits.
Under the national interest approach, any reason for invading Panama
would have been sufficient if deemed in the national interest, including
the purpose of promoting democracy or other human rights.
334. Id. at 435.
335. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
Yet the outcome of decisions on whether-and when-and to what degree-to
usecombat forces abroad has never been more important than it is today. While we do
not seek to deter or settle all the world's conflicts, we must recognize that, as a major
power, our responsibilities and interests are now of such scope that there are few troubled
areas we can afford to ignore.
Id. at 436.
336. CARL VON CLAUSEWrrz, ON WAR 87 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret trans., 1976)
(1832).
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The view that the use of military force is first and foremost a
political issue is fundamentally flawed. Other scholars present a quite
different view. They believe that military force is to be used primarily
to execute judicial judgments, not political ones. As James Kent wrote:
War... is one of the highest trials of right; for, as princes and
states acknowledge no superior upon earth, they put themselves upon
the justice of God by an appeal to arms.117
This view is reflected in the "Marine's Hymn" which affirms that the
first reason for which Americans fight is "right and freedom."33 It
does not say "first to fight for national interest." Primacy is given to
law.
2. Support of American people and their elected
representatives.3 9-Secretary Weinberger's whole concern over the
public's support was not whether force had been authorized by the lawful
authority, but whether there was enough political support for the
proposed use of force. This is crucial not only for elected officials but
also for assuring the public's continuing support of U.S. servicemen and
their missions. It is noteworthy that Weinberger did not address
Congress' constitutional role other than to say that the legislative branch
had compromised "the centrality of decision-making authority in the
executive branch." 4  These six criteria are self-imposed by the
executive branch. The assumption is that it is the President's, and not
Congress', decision to authorize force. The American people supported
the Panama invasion." It is unclear, however, whether this support
existed beforehand or only after the invasion proved successful.
Seemingly, the American people are always initially supportive of
military actions.42
337. 1 Kent, supra note 1, at 47.
338. Marine's Hyn (Anthem of the U.S. Marine Corps).
339. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 442.
[B]efore the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable
assurance we will have the support of the American people and their elected
representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in
making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and
close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our
troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops
not to win, but just to be there.
Id.
340. Id. at 435-36.
341. Watson, supra note 36, at 22.
342. Id.
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3. Continual assessment of objectives and forces
committed.? 3-Scholars maintain that the continual assessment of
objectives and the forces committed equates to the proportionality
principle.' The problem with this view is that there is no indication
that it is the legal proportionality of just desert or restitution. It appears
simply to call for a continuing assessment of the national interest and
whether appropriate forces have been allocated to accomplish objectives.
Operation Just Cause was so short that this element did not come into
play in any significant way.
4. Clear intention of winning. ' 5-The "clear intention of
winning" is really a more specific statement of objectives. The objective
with any war should be to win. This element does seem nearly identical
to the just war element of reasonable hope of success. President Bush
was committed to this objective in Panama.'
5. Last resort.'7-The element of "last resort" in the Weinberger
Doctrine may appear identical to that same element in the just war
doctrine, but it is quite different. Because most use of force probably
falls into Weinberger's gray area the notion of war as a final remedy to
right a wrong does not come into play. Weinberger said force should be
used to prevent small problems from becoming big ones. As might be
343. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 442:
[Tihe relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their
size, composition and disposition-must be continually reassessed and adjusted if
necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict.
When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously
keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national
interest?" "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the
answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be
in combat.
Id.
344. Just War Thinking and its Contemporary Application, supra note 280, at 105.
345. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 441.
[I]f we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should
do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to
commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not
commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to
win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly.
When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then
could perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II.
Id.
346. PRESIDENT'S LETFER, supra note 18, at 2.
347. "M[The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort." Weinberger, supra
note 285, at 442.
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expected, Weinberger articulated no requirement for a declaration of
war.
6. Clearly defined objectives. -This criterion is entailed in 3
and 4 above.
VI. Law in Support of Policy
A critical issue that underlies an analysis of Operation Just Cause
from the perspective of customary international law, the U.S.
Constitution, and just war doctrine is the relationship between law and
policy. Great powers are perceived by others, and perhaps themselves,
as acting solely on the basis of national interest with bare deference paid
to legality. For example, the expansive reinterpretation of self-defense
under the U.N. Charter's article 51, and the assertion of a right of
intervention, heighten this perception and undermine great power
credibility.349 On the other hand, the advocacy of unilateral adherence
to a narrow interpretation of article 51 fosters cynicism and contempt for
international law. 30 This dichotomy highlights a fundamental problem,
the perception that law and sound foreign policy are incompatible.
Compliance with law is seen as an impediment to policy implementation
and as a severe handicap when dealing with other nations not similarly
encumbered.
The proper relationship between law and policy can be demonstrated
in considering the familiar adage that "honesty is the best policy." This
adage makes several assumptions. The first is that there are immutable
standards of conduct based on something other than expediency. The
second is that doing what is right is not simply compatible with policy.
It is the first step toward sound policy decisions. Finally, this adage
assumes a view of reality in which compliance with the dictates of right
348. Weinberger, supra note 285, at 441-42.
[I]f we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly
defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces
can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces
needed to do just that. As Clausewitz wrote, "No one starts a war-or rather, no one in
his senses ought to do so-without first being clear in his mind what he intends to
achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it."
War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but the need for well-defined
objectives and a consistent strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat
mission has become necessary for our vital national interest, then we must send forces
capable to do the job-and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for
peacekeeping.
Id.
349. See supra parts 1n.B, M.C.
350. See supra part lII.B.
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conduct guarantees the attainment of true self-interest. The same should
be said about law: "legality is the best policy." Of course, this whole
analysis assumes that there are immutable and knowable standards of
right and wrong and that they form the basis of the legal system.
The medieval just war writers and the great commentators on
customary international law did not have the theoretical problem of
trying to harmonize law and policy. They believed that there are
immutable principles of divine or natural law revealed to men and
nations, and consequently, justice was inseparable from sound policy,
and a breach of justice was never advantageous."' This belief
presupposed that positive law and policy decisions are made in the
context of, and in conformity to, a legal order and superintending will
that rules over nations and the affairs of men.
This extreme tension between the demands of law and policy is a
product of legal positivism. Legal positivism altered the view of
international and domestic law during the 19th century.352 It views law
as merely a human convention with no necessary moral content.353
Law then is nothing but one more political instrument to achieve policy
objectives or to engineer a particular social or world order. When the
legal instrument proves ineffective, nations resort to more expedient
means. What begins as an implementation of policy by positive law
becomes "an extension of policy by military force." 354
The legal positivist chooses both the ends of the social order, and,
through political and social experimentation, the best means of achieving
those ends. For the positivist, law is not right or wrong. It is simply
effective or ineffective as an instrument of political and social control.
The legal positivist, be it on the international or domestic level,
faces two major problems that are highlighted in the legal analysis of
Operation Just Cause. The first is that the goals or ends for which laws
are made may change. The second is that the particular legal instrument
or means may prove ineffective in achieving the ends for which these
laws are made. The simple solution is to change the law so that it suits
the new ends or proves more effective in accomplishing the old ends.
Nevertheless, this is not so easily accomplished when dealing with
constitutional documents. The U.S. Constitution is very difficult to
amend and the U.N. Charter nearly impossible.3 5   The only remedy
351. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
352. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
353. Id.
354. CLAUSEWrrz, supra note 336, at 87.
355. See U.S. CONST., art. V; U.N. CHARTER, arts. 108, 109.
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then is the disingenuous one of reinterpreting the document, as has
happened with both the U.S. Constitution and the U.N. Charter.356
Those taking issue with this subterfuge are sure to be derisively labeled
"textualists."
The fundamental purposes or ends of the United Nations as set out
in article one of the Charter have certainly remained the same.357 The
problem is that the means, or peacekeeping scheme of articles 39-51,
have proven to be quite ineffective. 358 As a result, nations and writers
have devised ways to reinterpret or ignore the Charter since it would be
so difficult to change. Perhaps there is nothing wrong with the ends,
depending on one's vision of peace, but the means as established in the
Charter deny nation-states the right to do justice. 59 Indeed, this is an
illustration of a policy-oriented jurisprudence, which is in effect a denial
of the rule of law. Elite decision makers free themselves from a
"conformity-imposing textuality" in order to utilize those means which
they believe promote fundamental values and public order. aW
With the U.S. Constitution, however, the problem seems to be a
change of national mission or ends. The mission has changed from an
emphasis on protecting the rights of citizens from an overbearing
government to discharging the responsibilities of a world power. This
view calls for increased efficiency which may be translated as an
expansion of executive prerogative. Secretary Weinberger has also
stressed the fact that the United States has responsibilities as world
leader.36' This fact implies a new mission, one different from that
upon which the nation was founded. Because the United States is either
the world policeman or is in a perpetual state of war on a thousand
fronts, the President apparently must be able to continually choose when
and where to engage the enemy or enforce the law. Unfortunately, the
conflict between the executive and legislative branches is not so much
over a change in national mission, but a conflict over who controls the
means to establish and attain it.362
The United States is uniquely situated in world history to serve a
leadership role that is not based on the old-world model. The founding
356. See supra parts III, IV.
357. See supra part III.B.
358. Id.
359. Judge Sofaer's disdain for the text of the Charter is clear in his rejection of the mechanical
application of rules, of "juristic push-button devices," and of reliance on abstract propositions. See
The Legality of the United States Action in Panama, supra note 173.
360. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
361. See Weinberger, supra note 285, at 436.
362. See supra part IV.
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mission of preserving liberty and influencing the world by example has
been savaged by a new mission that ranges from establishing democracy
in Latin America, to defending Europe against communism, to saving a
world economy dependent on Mideast oil.363 The change in national
mission domestically and internationally has driven the United States to
the brink of economic and moral ruin. Making policy judgments in
disregard of law based upon a higher moral order is a prescription for
disaster.
VII. Conclusion: Salvaging a Just Cause
Just cause is the primary criterion justifying the use of armed
force. It forms the heart of the customary law doctrine of jus ad
bellum. The classic legal treatises adopted just cause and several other
elements from the just war doctrine of Christian thought. Critical
distinctions between offensive and defensive war, legal and prudential
judgments, and act of war and state of war follow from just cause.
The allocation of war powers in the U.S. Constitution is based upon
this analytical framework. Because of its natural law basis, just cause
is the jus cogens governing the use of force. For this reason, jus
cogens is not only a thread common to customary international law,
the U.S. Constitution and just war doctrine, it is the thread that runs
so true. The U.N. Charter scheme, the Weinberger Doctrine, and
intervention for ideological reasons are incompatible with an approach
which focuses on just cause.
By designating the invasion of Panama as Operation Just Cause,
President Bush salvaged the essential moral and legal focus of the
decision to go to war. If, however, just cause is just another name for
national interest, law is reduced to just politics. The United States, in
fact, had just cause for invading Panama, but the just cause has to be
salvaged from the unsatisfactory rationales offered by the
Administration. Although judgment on General Noriega was well-
deserved, the President acted unlawfully in executing this invasion
without the necessary judicial and prudential judgments of Congress.
These deficiencies stemmed in part from the pursuit of a national
mission that is incompatible with the Constitution.
363. David Hume savaged the old model of foreign policy that financed war by mortgaging the
public revenues while entrusting posterity to pay off the encumbrances. DANIEL GEORGE LANG,
FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE BALANCE OF POWER
42 (1985).

